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Too Little, Too Late: 
The Pace of Adjudication  
of the Inter-American Commission  
on Human Rights 
ARIEL DULITZKY* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Inter-American System for the protection of human rights 
(“the System”) is formed principally by the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights (“the Commission” or “IACHR”) and the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (“the Court” or “IACHR”) of the 
Organization of American States (OAS).1 In its 50 years of functioning, 
it has had important achievements in the promotion and defense of 
human rights in the region. The System played an essential role when 
 
* Clinical Professor of Law, University of Texas at Austin School of Law. I would like to thank 
the students of the Human Rights Clinic who for two years worked the study that serves as the 
basis of this article. Their dedication was and is an inspiration to me, see infra note 27. I also 
would like to thank Lawrence Helfer, Daniel Brinks and Alexandra Huneeus; the participants of 
the workshop Impacto y eficacia del sistema americano de derechos humanos: Perspectivas 
empíricas y experiencias prácticas, June 22nd, 2011, Buenos Aires, Argentina; of the Panel: 
Regional Human Rights System in Socio-Legal Perspective at the 2012 International Conference 
on Law and Society, Honolulu, Hawai’i, June 5–8, 2012 and of the Rapoport Center for Human 
Rights and Justice Summer Fellows Workshop at the University of Texas School of Law, August 
8, 2012, for their comments, reflections, and critiques of the original ideas and preliminary 
versions of this article. I would like to thank the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
and its Secretariat for having read a preliminary version of the study that serves as the basis for 
this article, for having received the Human Rights Clinic to present the report and for having 
provided us with invaluable information. Particular thanks to Santiago Canton and Elizabeth Abi-
Mershed. As always my conversations with Denise Gilman help to sharpen my ideas. Of course, 
all errors are my exclusive responsibility. 
 1. See SCOTT DAVIDSON, THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM 8 (1997). In 
reality, when speaking of the Inter-American human rights system, one should think more broadly 
than the Commission and Court. As this article will show, there are very relevant actors that 
influence the System and its pace of adjudication including (disaggregated) Statesindividually 
and collectivelythe OAS, its Secretary General, human rights organizations and the victims of 
human rights abuses. See also Ariel Dulitzky, The Inter-American Human Rights System Fifty 
Years Later: Time For Changes, Special Edition, REVUE QUÉBÉCOISE DE DROIT 
INTERNATIONAL 127, 128 (2011) [hereinafter Dulitzky, Fifty Years]. For the idea of a 
disaggregated State or multiple autonomous State actors and their relationship with the Inter-
American human rights system and its implications for compliance.  See Alexandra Huneeus, 
Courts Resisting Courts: Lessons From The Inter-American Court’s Struggle To Enforce Human 
Rights, 44 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 493 (2011). 
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authoritarian regimes were the rule in the hemisphere. It denounced and 
condemned the massive and systematic human rights violations that 
took place then.2 The System contributed to a broader awakening of 
civil society in its fight against the military rulers. At the same time, the 
System helped the return or establishment of democracy in many 
countries.3 The 1980 report by the Commission on human rights in 
Argentina4 is the paradigmatic example of the work of the System 
during those dark years in the region.5  
During the last twenty or thirty years, Latin America experienced a 
turn from military dictatorships and civil wars toward free elections.6 A 
simple reflection on the situation in 1978, the year when the American 
Convention on Human Rights7 (“American Convention” or 
“Convention”) entered into force, is a good example. There were civil 
wars or military governments in Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Argentina, 
Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay, Chile, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, 
Guatemala, Panama and Haiti.8 Colombia was living in a situation of 
widespread violence caused by the army, guerrilla and drug trafficking 
groups.9 Venezuela suffered from periodic attempts of coups d’etat. In 
those years, there were gross and massive violations of human rights in 
Mexico.10 Forced disappearances, extrajudicial executions, death 
squads, clandestine detention camps, tortures, and rapes were 
commonplace.11 
 
 2. See CECILIA MEDINA QUIROGA, THE BATTLE OF HUMAN RIGHTS, GROSS, SYSTEMATIC 
VIOLATIONS AND THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, (1988).  
 3. Antonio Cançado Trindade, El Sistema Interamericano de Protección de los Derechos 
Humanos (1948–1995): Estado Actual y Perspectivas, DERECHO INTERNACIONAL Y DERECHOS  
HUMANOS, (ed. By Bardonnet and Cançado Trindade) (1996). 
 4. INFORME SOBRE LA SITUACIÓN DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS EN ARGENTINA (1980), 
OEA/SerL/V/II.49 Doc 19 (Apr. 11, 1980) [Arg.]. Lewis H. Diuguid, OAS Rights Group Accuses 
Argentina Of Torture and of Killing Thousands, THE WASHINGTON POST, Apr. 20, 1980, § 1, at 
A18.  
 5. See David Weissbrodt & Maria Luisa Bartolomei, The Effectiveness of International 
Human Rights Pressures: The Case of Argentina, 1976–1983, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1010 (1991). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 
1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter American Convention].  
 8. See Brian E. Loveman, Military Government in Latin America 1959−1990, THE 
OXFORD BIBLIOGRAPHIES (Nov. 11, 2012, 11:50 AM), 
http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199766581/obo-9780199766581-
0015.xml;jsessionid=EE98FB770E701890EBE4D4732A682CD5?print.  
 9. Ricardo Vargas, The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Illicit 
Drug Trade (June 7, 1999) available at http://www.tni.org/briefing/revolutionary-armed-forces-
colombia-farc-and-illicit-drug-trade. 
 10. See AMNESTY INT’L, 1980 ANNUAL REPORT 150–53, available at 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/POL10/003/1980/en/4eaa8da9-d3b3-46f4-b429-
8cf536834e07/POL100031980eng.pdf. 
 11. Id. 
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Today, the reality has changed dramatically. The only country in 
the Hemisphere where there are no free elections is Cuba. There are no 
civil wars in Central America. In 2000, for the first time in modern 
Mexican history, the opposition won the Presidency.12 Nevertheless, 
widespread police violence, organized crime, corruption, intimidation 
and lack of independence of judges and courts, discrimination against 
indigenous peoples and Afro-descendants, undue restriction of freedom 
of expression and violence against journalists, human rights defenders 
and social actors, violence and discrimination against women, impunity 
for human rights abuses are still present throughout the region.13 Social, 
economic and cultural rights are far from being a reality for vast sectors 
of the population in the Hemisphere.14 
The expectation that, in this changed context, the number of 
complaints filed with the IACHR would diminish has proven to be 
wrong.15 In fact, as civil society flourished in Latin America and the 
System became better known, the number and complexity of petitions 
filed with the Commission has steadily grown.16 With limited resources 
allocated by the OAS, this situation has resulted in a “considerable 
workload for the IACHR, which affects the prompt and efficient 
processing of cases, particularly in terms of the backlog of cases, 
procedural delays, and repetition of the acts . . . in proceedings.”17 The 
Commission has introduced various reforms to its internal practices and 
Rules of Procedure (“Rules”) to deal with the new influx of complaints. 
But still, there is a growing backlog and the length of adjudication has 
reached an unacceptable point.  
 
 12. MATTHEW C. GUTMANN, THE ROMANCE OF DEMOCRACY: COMPLAINT DEFIANCE IN 
CONTEMPORARY MEXICO 10 (2002), available at 
http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=lfxRL3W764cC&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=mexico+
election+2000&ots=avnvKQ0Gxk&sig=K4A9YiMTUaUqLqKMrbZHRkHyWkQ#v=onepage&
q=mexico%20election%202000&f=false. 
 13. See AMNESTY INT’L, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 234–38, available at 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/annual-report/2012/americas.  
 14. Id.  
 15. Nancy Thede and Hugues Brisson, International Relations and the Inter-American 
System of Human Rights promotion and protection. Strategic exploitation of windows of 
opportunity. Special Edition, REVUE QUÉBÉCOISE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 7, 19 (2011); See 
also OAS, Permanent Counsel, Report of the Special Working Group to Reflect on the Workings 
of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights with a view to Strengthening the Inter-
American Human Rights System for consideration by the Permanent Council, 11, 
GT/SIDH/13/11/rev. 2 [hereinafter OAS Working Group] (stating that “in recent years the 
number of cases and petitions processed by the IACHR had progressively escalated as a result of 
progress in the consolidation of democracy in the Hemisphere and increased participation and 
awareness among users of the [system]”). 
 16. OAS Working Group, supra note 15, at 11. 
 17. Id.  
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Although some progress has been made, States and petitioners 
experience long wait times before receiving a decision from the 
Commission on the merits of a case. For example, in the Isaza Uribe 
case, the Commission adopted an admissibility report more than 20 
years after receiving the petition.18 Though the Commission originally 
requested information from the State both on admissibility and merits, it 
decided only on the admissibility issues. From November 1991 to 
August 1995 and then from August 1998 to November 2009, there was 
no procedural activity.19 In its admissibility report, the Commission 
considered that twenty-three years of criminal investigation constituted 
undue delay, despite the fact that it took the IACHR twenty-one years to 
arrive at that conclusion.20 The Commission noted that the State did not 
justify or explain the period of time that passed without procedural 
activity.21 Nevertheless, the Commission did not provide any 
justification for its own inactivity. As Helfer stated in reference to the 
European Court of Human Rights (“European Court”), it is ironic that 
sometimes a human rights body takes longer to decide a case than the 
maximum length of time the System allows for proceedings in national 
courts.22  
While the Izasa Uribe case is an extreme example, there is a 
consensus that the Commission’s process is too slow and that the 
Commission has historically struggled to deal with petitions in a timely 
manner.23 This view is so unexceptional that there are very few 
 
 18. The petition was received in December 1990 and the admissibility report was adopted on 
July 22, 2011. See Víctor Manuel Isaza Uribe And Family (Columbia), Admissibility Report, 
Report No. 102/11, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Petition No. 10.737, (July 22, 2011). 
 19. Id. ¶¶ 5–6.  
 20. Id. ¶ 29.  
 21. Id.  
 22. Laurence R. Helfer, Redesigning the European Court of Human Rights: Embeddedness 
as a Deep Structural Principle of the European Human Rights Regime, 19 EJIL 125, 133 (2008).  
The European system confronts a similar but much bigger backlog and delay problem.  
 23. Comm. on Int’l Human Rights, The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: A 
Promise Unfulfilled, 48 REC. ASS’N B. CITY N.Y. 589, 602–04 (1993); INSTITUTO 
LATIONAMERICANO DE SERCICIOS LEGALES ALTERNATIVOS (ILSA), SISTEMA INTERAMERICANO 
PARA LA PROTECCION DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS. APORTES PARA UNA EVALUACION (1994) at 
66−67; Dinah Shelton, Improving Human Rights Protections: Recommendations for Enhancing 
the Effectiveness of the Inter-American Commission and Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
3 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 323, 330 (1988); HECTOR FAUNDEZ LEDESMA, EL SISTEMA 
INTERAMERICANO DE PROTECCIÓN DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS, 507 (2004); Ariel Dulitzky, La 
Duración Del Procedimiento Ante El Sistema Interamericano De Protección De Los Derechos 
Humanos: Responsabilidades Compartidas, EL FUTURO DEL SISTEMA INTERAMERICANO DE 
PROTECCIÓN DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS 365 (Juan E. Méndez & Francisco Cox eds., 1998); 
Robert K. Goldman, History and Action: The Inter-American Human Rights System and the Role 
of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 31 HUM. RTS. Q. 856, 882−83 (2009), 
available at  
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1027&context=facsch_lawr
ev. 
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examinations on the length of the IACHR’s adjudication process and no 
known integral quantitative or empirical studies on its pace of individual 
petition processing.24 Most studies of the Commission highlight the 
problems caused by the delays, the need to expedite cases and 
recommendations on how to achieve that goal.25 But given that the pace 
of adjudication is central to the efficiency and effectiveness of the work 
of the Commission, it is crucial to understand the exact pace, how and 
why delays occur, what the extent of the backlog is, and crucially, what 
the proper policy framework is to understand and deal with such pace.26 
This article explores these questions.  
Much of the research and analysis included in this article relies 
heavily on the results of a two-year study that I conducted with my 
students enrolled in the Human Rights Clinic at the University of Texas 
School of Law (“the Human Rights Clinic” or “the Clinic”).27 The 
purpose of the study was to examine the IACHR’s length of procedure, 
identify the causes of the delays, and make recommendations that could 
improve the Commission’s efficiency. For that purpose, we created a 
database chronicling the length of time of each step in the 
Commission’s procedures for every adjudicated petition and case since 
1996.28 We also compiled information on the length of time it took for 
subsequent procedures for each case in the Inter-American Court.29 As a 
result of our research, we produced a report entitled, “Maximizing 
 
 24.  I know of only two studies, not exclusively empirical, written specifically on the length 
of the procedure of the System. The first one is a short article that I wrote 15 years ago. See 
Dulitzky, Duración, supra note 23. And the second, is a recent article, Federico Ramos, The Need 
For An In-Time Response: The Challenge For The Inter-American Commission On Human 
Rights For The Next Decade 18 SW. J. INT’L L. 159 (2011). 
 25. See also Alex Whiting, International Criminal Prosecutions, Justice Delayed Can Be 
Justice Delivered, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 323, 363 (2009) in the context of international criminal 
law. 
 26. For a similar question in the context of international criminal justice, see Jean 
Galbraith, The Pace of International Criminal Justice, 31 MICH. J. INT’L L. 79 (2009).  
 27. Under my supervision, Grace Beecroft, Priya Bhandari, Robert Brown, Stacy 
Cammarano, Amy Fang, Nicholas Hughes, Nishi Kothari, and Monica Uribe participated in 
different stages of the research and report writing process. Celina Van Dembroucke created the 
first version of the database that was updated with the support of Carlos Mejias, Anne-Marie 
Huff, Victoria Cruz, Melissa Brightwell, Anna Koob, and Katie Sobering. Ted Magee, the Clinic 
Administrator, and Shailie Thakkar edited the final version of the report. As the Clinic’s Director 
and former Assistant Executive Secretary of the Commission, I developed the research 
methodology, supervised the work, reviewed the different drafts of the report, and was 
responsible for the final version of the report. 
 28. HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC, UNIV. OF TEXAS SCH. OF LAW, MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, 
MINIMIZING DELAY: STREAMLINING PROCEDURES OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS 4 (2011), available at 
http://www.utexas.edu/law/clinics/humanrights/work/Maximizing_Justice_Minimizing_Delay_at
_the_IACHR.pdf [hereinafter MAXIMIZING JUSTICE]. 
 29. Id. 
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Justice, Minimizing Delay: Streamlining Procedures of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights”30 (the “Report”), completed 
in December 2011.31 This article, particularly sections IV-VI, borrows 
extensively from the research and analysis, as well as some language, in 
the Report.  
The Report’s main findings are that overall, there is a large 
backlog of cases, the Commission’s procedure is frontloaded, and 
petitions and cases have long wait times.32 Despite noteworthy progress, 
more petitions and cases are being added to the backlog every year.33 
Further, the Report shows that the Commission makes considerably 
more admissibility decisions than any other type of decision.34  
This increased backlog has created long wait times for 
petitioners.35 Using the database of publicly available reports, the Clinic 
determined that it takes an average of six and a half years from the 
initial submission of a petition to the final merits decision.36 Within that 
time, it takes over four years just for a decision on admissibility.37 The 
Clinic’s findings demonstrate that the average wait time for each type of 
decision has increased progressively for the last fifteen years.38 Part of 
the increase in the wait times could be attributed to the fact that the 
Commission is currently dealing with a backlog of old petitions.39  
The data suggests that the reforms to the Rules in 2000 and 2009, 
as well as the reorganization of the Executive Secretariat in 2008, have 
not reduced the length of time from the submission of petitions to their 
final resolution.40 The Report concludes that the 2000 reforms dividing 
the procedure into admissibility and merits is one of the main factors 
 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 1.  
 32. Id. at 3. 
 33. Id. at 4. 
 34. HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC, UNIV. OF TEXAS SCH. OF LAW, MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, 
MINIMIZING DELAY: STREAMLINING PROCEDURES OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS 4 (2011), 
http://www.utexas.edu/law/clinics/humanrights/work/Maximizing_Justice_Minimizing_Delay_at
_the_IACHR.pdf 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id.  
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC, UNIV. OF TEXAS SCH. OF LAW, MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, 
MINIMIZING DELAY: STREAMLINING PROCEDURES OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS 4 (2011), 
http://www.utexas.edu/law/clinics/humanrights/work/Maximizing_Justice_Minimizing_Delay_at
_the_IACHR.pdf 
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leading to the current backlog and delay,41 as it shifted the focus of the 
Commission to the admissibility stage.42  
This article, which borrows some sections from the writings of the 
Clinic’s Report, begins with an overview of the Commission and its 
multiple functions, including the adjudicatory ones. Next, the article 
goes into the results of the empirical research to assess the growing 
backlog and long procedural delays based on the database we created. 
The following section considers some of the factors contributing to the 
current situation. I continue with a critical description of the procedural, 
administrative and technical measures adopted by the Commission in 
the last decade. While there are several reforms that have had a positive 
impact, the article also identifies well-intended reforms that have had 
unintended negative consequences.43  
The article then moves into a discussion on what makes a human 
rights body effective and how the pursuit of efficacy could complement 
or contradict the purpose of being an effective adjudicator 
simultaneously. The article explains why a goal-based definition of 
effectiveness is needed in order to both assess the performance of the 
Commission and the possibilities and limitations of the measures that 
the Commission could adopt to speed up its process, and to deal with its 
current backlog. In order to do that, I explore the different goals that the 
Commission pursues in its adjudicatory role. Based on this analysis, the 
article presents several recommendations—some already included in the 
Report—including both internal reforms and changes to the Rules, 
which could increase efficiency while preserving or even strengthening 
the effectiveness of the Commission. While I conclude that lack of 
sufficient financial resources is one of the main factors contributing to 
the current situation, I also argue for the implementation of several 
measures that do not require additional resources or that could improve 
the efficient use of the limited funds currently available to the 
Commission.  
 
 41. Id. 
 42.  Id. 
 43. This article does not deal with the changes in the Rules of Procedure of the Commission 
that were introduced on March 19, 2013 in detail. Press Release, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., 
IACHR Approves Reform of its Rules of Procedure, Policies and Practices (Washington, D.C., 
Mar. 19, 2013), ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, 
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/media_center/PReleases/2013/019.asp. The article makes references 
to some of those reforms where pertinent. For an analysis of the draft of those reforms, see Letter 
from Ariel Dulitzky, Dir., Human Rights Clinic, University of Texas School of Law, to Emilio 
Álvarez Icaza, Executive Secretariat, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN 
STATES, available at 
http://www.oas.org/es/cidh/consulta2013/docs/UTAustin%20Human%20Rights%20Clinic%20C
omments%20on%20IACHR%20Proposals.pdf. 
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II.  OVERVIEW OF THE COMMISSION: MULTIPLE FUNCTIONS  
INCLUDING ADJUDICATORY ONES 
The OAS adopted the American Declaration of the Rights and 
Duties of Man (“American Declaration”) in May 1948.44 The 
Commission was created ten years later, in 1959, with a vague mandate 
and a weak juridical constitution.45 It is composed of seven members 
who are elected in their individual capacity by the OAS General 
Assembly.46 The Convention assigned the Commission specific 
conventional duties and powers.47 It also created the IACHR, which is 
composed of seven judges elected by the General Assembly of the 
OAS.48 The IACHR is an autonomous organ of the OAS, as mandated 
by the OAS Charter,49 the Convention, and its Statute.50 The body meets 
in at least two regular sessions per year but may convene in 
extraordinary circumstances.51 The Commission has been entrusted to 
promote the observance and protection of human rights in the 
Americas52 by exercising political, diplomatic, legal, and adjudicatory 
powers.  
The IACHR monitors compliance with treaty obligations for the 
twenty-five member States that have ratified the Convention.53 The 
Commission monitors compliance with the eleven member states that 
have not yet become parties to the Convention by applying the human 
 
 44. See Organization of American States, American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of 
Man, May 2, 1948, O.A.S. [hereinafter Declaration] (adopted by the Ninth International 
Conference of American States on May 2, 1948). 
 45. What is the IACHR?, ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES (Jan. 27, 2013), 
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/what.asp.  
 46. American Convention, supra note 7, arts. 34, 36. 
 47. Id. art. 41.  
 48. Id. arts. 52−53. 
 49. Organization of American States Charter, Dec. 13, 1951, art. 106, 119 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 50. Organization of American States, Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights, art. 1, O.A.S. G.A. Res. 447 (Oct. 1979) [hereinafter Commission Statute]. 
 51. Rules of Procedure, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., art. 14.1 [hereinafter Commission Rules 
of Procedure] (amended 2011). 
 52. Id. art. 1.1. 
 53. Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Trinidad and 
Tobago ratified the Convention on April 3, 1991 and denounced it on May 26, 1998. American 
Convention On Human Rights "Pact Of San Jose, Costa Rica”, B-32, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144. 
U.N.T.S. 144, available at http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_B-
32_American_Convention_on_Human_Rights_sign.htm#. On September 12th 2012, Venezuela 
announced its decision to denounce the American Convention in accordance with Article 78. 
Letter from Mr. José Miguel Insulza, Secretary General, Organization of American States, to 
Minister of Popular Power for Foreign Affairs of the Bolivian Republic of Venezuela, (Sept. 6, 
2012), available at 
http://www.oas.org/dil/Nota_Rep%C3%BAblica_Bolivariana_Venezuela_to_SG.English.pdf.  
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rights obligations set forth in the Declaration.54 The Court monitors 
compliance under the Convention for the twenty countries that have 
become parties to the Convention and that have recognized its 
compulsory jurisdiction.55 
In addition to its adjudicative functions in the case system, the 
IACHR has received other important promotional, monitoring, and 
diplomatic tasks.56 These multiple functions compete for the scarce time 
and resources of the Commission. In the last several years, the 
Commission has increased the number of activities that it carries out in 
addition to adjudicating cases.57 For instance, the IACHR has increased 
the number of thematic reports it issues from one—prior to 2001—to 
twenty between 2002 and 2010.58 In 2011, the IACHR “took cognizance 
of over 400 urgent requests for precautionary measures, held 91 
hearings and 54 Working Meetings, carried out over 30 Working Visits, 
issued 138 Press Releases and conducted 5 Seminars and Training 
Sessions.”59 
Some of the additional promotional activities of the Commission 
have direct and positive impact on the adjudication of cases.60 For 
example, the Commission has created several “rapporteurships”61 that 
 
 54. Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Belize, Canada, Guyana, St. Kitts and Nevis, Saint 
Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago and U.S. The eleventh country, 
which has not yet ratified the Convention, is Cuba. Resolution VI of the Eighth Meeting of 
Consultation Ministers of Foreign Affairs (1962) excluded "the present government of Cuba from 
participation in the inter-American system." See Interpretation of the American Declaration of 
Rights and Duties of Man Within the Framework of Article 64 of the American Convention on 
Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-10/89, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 10, ¶¶ 40−45 (July 
14, 1989); James Terry Roach and Jay Pinkerton v. United States of America, Case 9647, Inter-
Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 3/87, OEA/Ser.L/V, ¶¶ 46−49 (1987). 
 55. Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, 
Suriname, Uruguay, and Venezuela. For the situation of Venezuela, see supra note 53. 
 56. These additional duties include: developing awareness of human rights; making 
recommendations to Member State governments; preparing studies and reports; requesting 
information from Member States on the measures adopted to address human rights concerns; 
responding to Member State inquiries on human rights matters and providing those States with 
the requested advisory services if possible; and submitting an annual report to the General 
Assembly of the OAS. American Convention, supra note 7, art. 41. See MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, 
supra note 28, at 17. 
 57. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 17.  
 58. Information prepared for the Human Rights Clinic of the University of Texas School of 
Law in relation to the draft Study on Efficiency and Effectiveness of the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights [hereinafter Commission’s Answers]. 
 59. See Position Document on the Process of Strengthening of the Inter-American System 
for the Protection of Human Rights, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II, ¶ 29, doc. 68 
(2012).  
 60. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 17. 
 61. Id. The IACHR has created thematic rapporteurships to devote its attention to key issues 
and to certain groups, communities, and peoples that are in a situation of special vulnerability and  
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focus on certain vulnerable groups in order to promote thematic areas.62 
Rapporteurships play a role in the processing of individual petitions and 
cases. Rapporteurships also draft decisions on admissibility and merits 
for petitions and cases in their respective thematic areas, litigate or 
support cases in their areas before the Court,63 provide expert 
knowledge to the Commission in the handling of those cases, and follow 
up on the Commission’s recommendations on those cases.64   
The Commission conducts on-site and working visits to Member 
States for the purpose of monitoring and promoting human rights in that 
country.65 In the last decade, the Commission increased the number of 
working visits it conducted.66 Visits provide support for the adjudicative 
role of the Commission as they help the Commission contextualize the 
individual complaints and facilitate the understanding of the underlying 
problems. The visits also raise the profile of the Commission, which in 
turn attracts new petitions and strengthens the legitimacy of the 
Commission by supporting implementation of its decisions.67 Visits 
further afford petitioners the opportunity to file new complaints68 or to 
 
have faced historical discrimination. The aim of the thematic rapporteurships is to strengthen, 
promote, and systematize the Commission's own work on the pertinent issue. The offices of 
rapporteurs may be assigned to a member of the Commission or to other persons designated by 
the Commission. Currently there are eight Rapporteurships on Women, Children, Migrant 
Workers and their Families, Human Rights Defenders, Afrodescendants and Against Racial 
Discrimination, Persons Deprived of Their Liberty, Indigenous Peoples and Freedom of 
Expression. The last one is the only rapporteurship assigned to a Special Rapporteur who is not a 
member of the Commission. See Thematic Rapporteurships and Units for Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, 
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/rapporteurships.asp (last visited July 29, 2013). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. For instance, IACHR Application before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
in the case of Claude Reyes et al. (Marcel Claude Reyes, Sebastian Cox Urrejola, and Arturo 
Longton Guerrero) Case No. 12.108 against the State of Chile (appointing Eduardo Bertoni, then 
Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, as Legal advisor of the Commission). See Claude 
Reyes et al. v. Chile, Case 12.108, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 60/03 (July 8, 2005), 
available at 
http://www.cidh.oas.org/demandas/12.108%20Claude%20Reyes%20Chile%208jul05%20ENGLI
SH.pdf. 
 64. For example, the website of the Rapporteurship on the Rights of the Child (stating that 
“[t]he Rapporteurship provides advice to the IACHR in the proceedings of individual petitions, 
cases and requests of precautionary and provisional measures which address the rights of the 
child”). See Rapporteurship on the Rights of the Child, ORG. OF AM. STATES, 
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/children (last visited Nov. 4, 2012).   
 65. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 18. 
 66. In 2002, the IACHR conducted five on-site country visits. In 2010, there were 10. See 
Commission’s Answers, supra note 58, at 12. 
 67. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 18. 
 68. For instance, during the visit to Peru in 1999, the Commission received more than 600 
new petitions. See Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Peru, Inter-Am. Comm’n 
H.R., Report No. 2, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106, doc. 59 rev. 3 (2000). 
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present new evidence.69 In addition to those benefits, visits give the 
Commission the chance to facilitate friendly settlements negotiations, 
evaluate implementation of previous recommendations, and promote 
strategies to apply the Convention and other Inter-American instruments 
and facilitate full compliance with the decisions of the Commission and 
the Court.70  
In sum, the multiple functions of the Commission are both an asset 
and a hindrance. As these functions have expanded to include the 
adjudicatory role, they have also resulted in a backlog of cases and 
presented important identity challenges to the IACHR. Today, OAS 
Member States are discussing where the focus of the Commission’s 
work should lie, and how the IACHR should balance all its different 
activities.71 
A.  Case Adjudication 
The Commission processes individual complaints acting as a 
quasi-judicial adjudicative body.72 Any person, group of persons, or 
non-governmental organization (NGO) claiming a violation of the rights 
protected in the American Convention,73 the American Declaration, or 
any other Inter-American instrument may file a petition.74 The petition 
may be presented on behalf of the person filing the petition or on behalf 
 
 69. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 18. 
 70. For instance, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R. Press Release 89/11: IACHR Concludes Working 
Visit to Paraguay. Washington, D.C., Aug. 12, 2011 (stating that the purpose of the visit was to 
conduct promotional activities, encourage compliance with the decisions of Commission and the 
Court, promote the use of the friendly settlement mechanism and to further its understanding of 
the human rights situation in Paraguay). See Press Release, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., IACHR 
Concludes Working Visit to Paraguay, Press Release 89/11 (Aug. 12, 2011). 
 71. OAS Working Group, supra note 15. 
 72. W. Michael Reisman, Practical Matters for Consideration in the Establishment of a 
Regional Human Rights Mechanism: Lessons from the Inter-American Experience, 1995 ST. 
LOUIS-WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC L.J. 89 (1995). 
 73.  American Convention, supra note 7, art. 44. 
 74. Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 51, art. 23. The other instruments are the 
Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence against 
Women “Convention of Belem do Para,” June 9, 1994, O.A.S.T.S. 1994 A-61 (entered into force 
Mar. 5, 1995), art. 12 [Convention of Belem do Para]; Inter-American Convention on Forced 
Disappearance of Persons, June 9, 1994, O.A.S.T.S. 1994 A-60 (entered into force Mar. 28 1996), 
art. 13 [Convention on Forced Disappearances]; Inter-American Convention to Prevent and 
Punish Torture, Sept. 12, 1985, O.A.S.T.S. 1985 No. 67 A-51 (entered into force Feb. 28, 1987), 
arts. 8, 16; Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights “Protocol of San Salvador,” Nov. 17, 1988, O.A.S.T.S. 
1988 No. 69 A-52 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1999), art. 19.6. 
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of a third person.75 The Commission may only process individual 
petitions against OAS member states.76  
The petitions presented to the Commission must show that the 
victim has exhausted all domestic remedies or that there is a permissible 
exception to this requirement.77 If domestic remedies have been 
exhausted, the petition must be presented to the Commission within six 
months after the notification of the final decision in the domestic 
proceedings.78 
Upon receiving a complaint, the Commission, acting through its 
Executive Secretariat, assigns the complaint a number and starts to 
evaluate it as a petition.79 If the petition meets prima facie elements for 
processability, it is transmitted to the State requesting its response on 
the admissibility requirements.80 The Commission can declare the 
petition inadmissible and issue an express decision to that effect, thus 
terminating the petition; or it can find the petition admissible, at which 
point the petition is registered as a case.81 The Commission need not 
formally declare a petition admissible before addressing the merits;82 
nevertheless, the Commission will do so in most cases. In serious and 
urgent cases, or when it is believed that the life or personal integrity of a 
person is in real and imminent danger, the Commission may request a 
response on the admissibility and merits.83 Also, in exceptional 
circumstances, the Commission may defer its admissibility decision and 
address it simultaneously with its final decision on the merits.84 Once a 
case is registered, the IACHR will give petitioners time to file a brief on 
 
 75. Metropolitan Nature Reserve v. Panama, Case 11.533, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report 
No. 88/03, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.118, doc. 70 rev. ¶ 27 (2003) (stating that referral to the Commission 
of individual petitions does not require, unlike established practice under the European System or 
under the United Nations Human Rights Committee, that petitioners be victims per se).  
 76. Brian D. Tittemore, The Dann Litigation and International Human Rights Law: The 
Proceedings and Decision of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 31 AM. INDIAN 
L. REV. 593, 600 (2007). 
 77. American Convention, supra note 7, art. 46; Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 
51, art. 31; see, e.g., Medellin, Ramírez Cardenas and Leal García, United States, Case 12.644, 
Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 90/90 (2009). 
 78. See American Convention, supra note 7, art. 46.1.b; Commission Rules of Procedure, 
supra note 51, art. 32.1. 
 79. Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 51, art. 29.1.a. 
 80. Id. arts. 30.1−30.2. 
 81. Id. arts. 36.1−30.2. 
 82. Id. art. 36.3; see, e.g., Velasquez Rodríguez Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 1, ¶¶ 39−41 (June 26, 1989) (stating that there is nothing in the 
Convention or in the Rules that requires an express declaration of admissibility, either at the 
Secretariat stage or later, when the Commission itself is involved). 
 83. Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 51, at arts 30.4, 30.7. 
 84. Id. art. 36.3. 
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the merits.85 The Commission will transmit that brief to the State and 
ask for its observations.86  
The IACHR can convene hearings on petitions and cases.87 
“During the hearing, the parties may present any document, testimony, 
expert report or item of evidence. At the request of a party or on its own 
initiative, the Commission may receive the testimony of witnesses or 
experts.”88 
At any point during the petition or case process, but always before 
ruling on the merits, at the request of the parties or at its own initiative, 
the Commission should attempt to engage in friendly settlement 
proceedings.89 If an agreement between the parties is reached, the 
Commission adopts a report on the agreement.90 If the process fails, the 
Commission rules on the merits, and transmits this preliminary report to 
the State with time to implement its recommendations.91 If the State has 
ratified the Convention and accepted the jurisdiction of the Court, the 
IACHR may refer the case to the Court for a decision on the merits.92 
When the State has failed to comply with its recommendations, there is 
a presumption that the Commission will refer the case to the Court.93  
If the case is not transmitted to the Court, the Commission shall 
issue a final merits report and give additional time to comply with the 
recommendations.94 Finally, the IACHR must decide whether to publish 
it.95 The Commission may then adopt the appropriate follow-up 
measures.96 
III. A BRIEF METHODOLOGICAL NOTE ON OUR RESEARCH97 
In order to study the pace of adjudication, the Human Rights Clinic 
created a database chronicling the length of time of each step in the 
Commission’s procedures for every adjudicated petition and case since 
1996 and up to 2010.98 The decisions themselves, located on the 
 
 85. Id. art. 37.1. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. art. 64.1. 
 88. Id. art. 65.1. 
 89. Rules of Procedure, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., art. 40.1 (amended 2011). 
 90. Id. art. 40.5. 
 91. Id. art. 44.2. 
 92. Id. art. 45.2. See also American Convention, supra note 7, art. 62.1. 
 93. Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 51, art. 45.1. 
 94. Id. arts. 47.1−47.2 
 95. Id. art. 47.3. 
 96. Id. art. 48.1. 
 97. See MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 30−31. 
 98. The database continues to be updated by the Human Rights Clinic. It can be accessed by  
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Commission’s website, served as the source of the data.99 We also 
compiled the length of time the procedures took for each case in the 
Court. The database omits petitions and cases that are currently waiting 
in the Commission’s docket as we do not have access to them. The 
Clinic created a table with all the published decisions and coded the 
dates of the initial submission and the date of the adoption of the 
published report, using the data contained in those reports.  
The database is limited as it only reflects the cases with published 
decisions. This limitation is likely insignificant to our final conclusions, 
because if anything, this omission leads to an understatement of the 
length of delays, as is later explained. In the past, the Commission chose 
to review petitions based on the strength of the petitioner’s facts, the 
legal arguments raised, the attitude of the respondent Government, 
and/or the constant follow-up of the petitioner.100 Only recently has the 
Commission adopted a stricter chronological order policy.101 Because 
previously published decisions were prioritized based on their strength, 
the database is predictably biased towards petitions and cases with 
speedier adjudications.102 Our findings go up to the end of 2010, the last 
published Annual Report at the time we concluded our study.  
In addition, this article’s findings are based on the analysis of 
quantitative data, interviews conducted with officers of the 
Commission’s Executive Secretariat, extensive research of primary and 
secondary sources, as well as my personal experience serving as 
Assistant Executive Secretary of the Commission between 2001 and 
2007. In March 2011, the Clinic prepared a list of questions that were 
submitted to the Executive Secretary of the Commission. The Clinic 
received comprehensive answers to these questions on October 4, 2011. 
The Clinic concluded its Report in December 2011, and in March of 
2012, we presented the results of our study to the plenary of the 
Commission. The report was released in July 2012.  
 
the public upon request to the Clinic. 
 99. Reports on Cases for Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, ORGANIZATION OF 
AMERICAN STATES, http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/decisions/cases_reports.asp.  
 100. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 31. It is my understanding that this policy was 
unusual for international and regional human rights bodies.   
 101. Id. Even so, there are clear exceptions to this rule. For example, consider the disparities 
among these three decisions adopted in March 2010 dealing with Brazilian petitions filed from 
2001 to 2005. José Do Egito Romão Diniz v. Brazil, Petition No. 262-05, Inter-Am. Comm’n 
H.R., Report No. 6/10 (Mar. 15, 2010) (submitted Mar. 14, 2005); Fátima Regina Nascimento de 
Oliveira and Maura Tatiane Ferreira Alves v. Brazil, Petition No. 12.378, Inter-Am. Comm’n 
H.R., Report No. 7/10 (Mar. 15, 2010) (submitted Mar. 22, 2001); Ivanildo Amaro da Silva et al. 
v. Brazil, Petition No. 1198-05, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., report No. 38/10 (Mar. 17, 2010) 
(submitted Oct. 24, 2005), all available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/casos/10.eng.htm. 
 102. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 31.  
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previously, as the Executive Secretariat brought in additional resources 
to specifically eliminate this backlog by the year 2015. Only since 2008 
has the Commission been able to evaluate more petitions per year than it 
receives.109  
Only 10% to 13% of new petitions are found by the Secretariat 
to be receivable or processable, which means that they meet the 
minimum requirements to be transmitted to the State.110 The Executive 
Secretariat summarily dismisses 87% to 90% without receiving any 
formal, public decision by the Commission.111 As such, this process lacks 
any type of oversight and accountability. Neither the members of the 
Commission nor the public in general know about the types of complaints, 
the States concerned, nor the reasons for the dismissal of 90 % of the new 
petitions by the Executive Secretariat. Even with this high percentage of 
new petitions dismissed, 130 to 275 new petitions are added to the 
Commission’s docket yearly.112  
The Commission cannot keep up with the demand for rulings on 
petitions and cases, thus forming a backlog. In 2010, the Commission 
added 275 new petitions to its docket. But that year, which was its most 
productive, the Commission only ruled on 153 petitions and cases, 
including fifty-five archival decisions.113 Only fifteen of these decisions 
fully adjudicated a petition, with four merits decisions, and eleven 
friendly settlements.114 On top of that, the Commission referred sixteen 
cases to the Court that year.115 The fifty-five archival decisions have 
effects similar to that of inadmissibility decisions in that they are 
eliminated from the list of pending cases and petitions.116 Of the 
remaining decisions, only seventy-three were determined admissible, 
which is just the first step in the process.117  
 
 
 
 
 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 25.  
 111. Id.  
 112. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 25. 
 113. Id. at 25. Archived cases are those where the grounds for the petition or case do not exist 
or subsist or where the information necessary for the adoption of a decision is unavailable. As a 
result, the Commission notifies the parties of the possibility of a decision to archive, requests 
more information, and eventually decides to archive the case. Commission Rules of Procedure, 
supra note 51, art. 42.  
 114. Id. 
 115. Id.  
 116. Id. at 26.  
 117. Id.  
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petitions from its docket than it did fifteen years ago.128 Additionally, 
the Commission now eliminates more cases and petitions through 
procedural decisions than through decisions on the merits, friendly 
settlement, or referrals to the Court.129 In 1996 the Commission 
eliminated almost 70% of its cases through friendly settlement, merit, or 
referrals to the Court compared with approximately 20% through 
archival and inadmissibility decisions.130 In 2010 the proportion 
reverted to just over 45% through archival and inadmissibility decisions, 
and a little over 20% in final decisions based on the merits of the case.131 
The Commission explains its focus on the initial stages of petitions 
as a stepped approach in addressing the backlog.132 As the current 
backlog predominantly lies in the initial phases and given the lack of 
resources, the Commission needed to concentrate in the stage with the 
biggest backlog.133 The Commission argues that additional resources 
could be allocated to other stages once the delay, in its early stages, is 
more reasonable.134 
While it is understandable that the Commission needed to start 
somewhere, and though there may be a higher number of backlogged 
new petitions or petitions in the admissibility stage, it is questionable 
whether taking an approach which does not consider the process as a 
whole will help reduce the overall backlog of the Commission and not 
simply defer the backlog to later and more time-consuming stages.  
Some numbers illustrate the consequences of the Commission’s 
backlog and its focus on the initial stages of the procedure. The IACHR 
adopted eighty-three reports—the highest number of admissibility 
reports within one year—in 2010. As of August 30, 2011, there were 
1,137 matters awaiting an admissibility decision.135 Even if no new 
petitions were filed, at the 2010 pace, it would take nearly sixteen years 
to fully decide all the admissibility petitions. For the merits decisions, 
only twenty-six cases were decided on the merits in 2010, but as of 
August 30, 2011, there were 515 matters awaiting a decision on the 
 
 128. HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC, UNIV. OF TEXAS SCH. OF LAW, MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, 
MINIMIZING DELAY: STREAMLINING PROCEDURES OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS (2011), 
http://www.utexas.edu/law/clinics/humanrights/work/Maximizing_Justice_Minimizing_Delay_at
_the_IACHR.pdf 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 29. Information provided by current and former members of the Secretariat. 
 133. Commission’s Answers, supra note 58, at 5. 
 134. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 29. Information provided by current and former 
members of the Secretariat. 
 135. Id. at 26. 
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Moreover, the average length has increased for all four types of 
decisions in the period covered by our database (1996-2010).140 The 
average wait time for an admissibility decision was over four years for 
decisions published between 2002 and 2010, but just under three years 
in the period between 1996-2001. Our data suggests that the changes in 
the Commission’s Rules in 2000 increased the time of adjudication. 
Similarly, for merits decisions, the average number of years that a 
petitioner has to wait is now higher than it was prior to 2008, the year 
the Executive Secretariat underwent major restructuring.141 As expected, 
our database was favorable to the Commission as it reflects only 
published decisions and not those petitions and cases waiting in the 
docket. According to IACHR’s data, the current average length of 
proceedings for petitions in the admissibility stage awaiting a decision is 
seventy months (6.83 years).142 Our data showed 4.02 years. The 
IACHR identified the average length of proceedings for cases in the 
merits stage awaiting a decision as eighty-six months (7.2 years).143 
This again is longer than the 6.51 years that our data suggests.144  
 
 
 
 140. The Clinic excluded archival decisions, as they were made public only in the last two 
years. 
 141. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 32. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 35. 
Average Years for Commission’s Decisions 
  Admissibility Archival Inadmissibility Friendly Settlement Merits Total 
Count of petitions 596 69 136 86 172 1,059 
Average Years 4.02 10.90 4.78 6.16 6.51 5.14 
Std Dev Year 2.86 4.82 2.98 3.37 3.29 3.63 
Median Years 3.25 8.04 4.40 5.87 5.96 4.29 
Max Years 20.92 19.85 14.60 20.56 14.67  
Min Years 0.39 2.36 0.31 0.99 1.29  
 
152 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Com
Total Dura
Loy. L.A. In
mission Proc
tion Compar
t’l & Comp. 
edure Lengt
ed to Duratio
L. Rev.
h by Time Pe
n After Tran
[Vol. 35:
riod:  
sfer to State
 
131 
 
  
2013] Too Little, Too Late 153 
 
 
Of course, if the Commission is dealing with its backlog of new 
petitions, the length of the procedure will increase because the IACHR 
will be deciding petitions and cases that have already been waiting for 
years. 
Also, the new practice of addressing petitions and cases in 
chronological order rather than by any other measure of priority may 
contribute to the increase in wait time. This is because the Commission 
is resolving cases that have already been delayed for some time. 
Nevertheless, the higher average of wait time cannot be entirely 
attributed to this shift in practice. The upward trend in wait time began 
before the Commission started to deal with backlogged petitions and the 
stronger focus on a chronological order.145 
To account for the disparity of dealing with older backlogged 
petitions we also measured the time between transmission of a petition 
to the State and the time of the Commission’s decision on the merits. By 
some doing, we are able to control the impact of the reduction of 
backlog of new petitions (as done by the Registry) by analyzing the 
average length of the proceeding. In the period from 1996 to 2001, an 
average of over 4.1 years elapsed from the time a petition was 
transmitted to a State to the time the Commission decided the case on 
the merits. From 2002-2007, that time decreased to just under three-and-
a-half years.146 However, in the period from 2008-2010, an average of 
six years elapsed from the petition’s filing with the State to the case’s 
merits decision.147 In other words, prioritizing chronological order 
necessarily means the average wait time will increase. But this change 
does not entirely account for all increases in adjudication times for 
petitions and cases, as the Commission does not follow a strict 
chronological order.148  
 
 
 
 145. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 45. 
 146. Id. at 33. During that period however, it still took an average of just over four years from 
the filing of a petition to the decision on the merits. Thus, more time was spent during the initial 
processing and the overall average time did not decrease. 
 147. Id. at 33−34. 
 148. Id.  
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Court: Average Time by Period (Years) 
Year 
Period 
Average of Years 
from Filing of 
Petition with 
Commission to 
Filing with Court 
Average of Years 
from File Date 
with Court to 
Merits 
Average of 
Years from 
Beginning to 
End 
1989-
1996 
2.53 2.38 6.93 
1996-
2001 
3.09 2.36 6.57 
2002-
2007 
5.80 1.68 7.67 
2008-
2010 
7.37 1.49 9.08 
The length of adjudication for cases in the Court further increases 
wait times.149 Cases before the Court take an average of almost eight 
years from the time the petition is filed with the Commission to the 
Court’s final resolution.150 Cases spent an average of one year and nine 
months in the Court after an average of more than five years and nine 
months in the Commission.151 The time that a petition or case takes to 
be processed by the Commission is much longer than the time it takes 
for a case to be processed by the Court. Because of the Commission’s 
larger caseload and additional procedural stages, an increased amount of 
time for the Commission to dispose of its cases is expected.152 Also, the 
Commission carries out many more functions than the Court does.153 
Thus, not all the Commission’s resources—be it time, funding or staff— 
can be allocated to individual complaints in the same manner as the 
 
 149. Id. at 35. 
 150. Id. The length of time is underestimated because in some cases, the final disposition is 
not the judgment itself but an interpretation of the Court’s judgment, pursuant to Article 68 of the 
Court’s Rules of Procedure. It is possible to also add the time that the case spends in the 
supervision stage until there is full compliance with the Tribunal’s decision. We decided not to 
count those years, as we were only interested in the time it takes for the Inter-American bodies to 
rule on the merits of a claim. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. As described in section II, the Commission carries promotional, diplomatic and 
monitoring activities. The Court performs only adjudicative and limited advisory functions. 
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Court can do.154 Nevertheless, since the Commission is a quasi-judicial 
body with more relaxed evidentiary rules, more general flexibility, and 
more negotiating powers, adjudication should take less time in the 
Commission than in the Court.155 The differences do not provide easy 
explanations to the fact that the time the Commission takes to process a 
case has consistently increased while the time for procedures in the 
Court has been in steady decline.156   
There is no significant difference in the time spent in the 
Commission’s proceedings between those cases that were finally 
decided by the Commission and those that were eventually decided by 
the Court.157 The Commission disposed of cases submitted to the Court 
an average of nine months faster than those that were never submitted to 
the Court.158 This discrepancy can be explained by the way we 
measured time periods and by the process of the publication of merits 
reports.159 The database records the date of publication of merits reports 
by the Commission, rather than the initial, unpublished adoption of the 
merits report.160 The time between the adoption of preliminary merits 
reports and publication of final merits reports is substantial. The 
Commission is required to first grant time to the State to comply with 
the Commission’s preliminary merits report before adopting a final 
merits report; and then, after granting additional time to the State, to 
decide its publication.161   
 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC, UNIV. OF TEXAS SCH. OF LAW, MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, 
MINIMIZING DELAY: STREAMLINING PROCEDURES OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS 38 (2011), 
http://www.utexas.edu/law/clinics/humanrights/work/Maximizing_Justice_Minimizing_Delay_at
_the_IACHR.pdf. 
 157. Id. at 35−36. 
 158. Id. at 36. 
 159. Id. 
 160. See American Convention, supra note 7, arts. 50−51. See also Commission Rules of 
Procedure, supra note 51, arts. 45, 47. 
 161. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 36. See also Commission Rules of Procedure, 
supra note 51, arts. 47.1−47.3.  
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V.  PROCEDURAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS AND THEIR IMPACT  
ON THE EFFICIENCY OF THE COMMISSION162 
In the last decade, the Commission has enacted several major 
procedural, administrative and technological changes, some of which 
were specifically designed to deal with the backlog and procedural 
delays.163 Particularly, the Commission twice made extensive rule 
changes that drastically altered the structure of the proceedings.164  
A. 2000 Rules of Procedure Reforms 
The most extensive rule revision occurred in 2000. The change 
divided the procedure into admissibility and merits. Reducing the 
backlog and timely resolution of petitions and cases were not explicit 
goals of these amendments.165 By splitting the admissibility phase and the 
merits phase into two separate stages, the overall impact of the 2000 
changes to the duration and backlog was negative.166 Doing so shifted the 
 
 162. In addition to the procedural reforms and the organizational changes explained in the 
text, in 2011, the Commission published a strategic plan, which included goals through the year 
2015. Maximizing, supra note 28, at 59. (citing ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, INTER-
AM. COMM’N H.R., STRATEGIC PLAN 2011-2015:  PROGRAMS AND ACTIONS PLANS (2011) 
[hereinafter STRATEGIC PLAN PART II]. The plan establishes concrete goals and specific targets, 
including reducing the backlog and length of adjudication as one of its priorities. "According to 
the Commission’s estimates, in order to achieve the goals in the plan, the budget must increase by 
over two and a half times between now and 2015." MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 59-
61. The goal of the IACHR is that by December 31, 2013, no petition presented prior to 
December 31, 2010 should be under review." Id. at 60. The Strategic Plan aims to eliminate the 
backlog in the admissibility and merits phases by 2015. Id. During this period, the Sections would 
have to quadruple their production capacity for the production of admissibility reports, and in the 
merits phase, the Sections would have to increase their production capacity six- fold. Id. at 59−61. 
The Strategic Plan demonstrates that the Commission is moving in the right direction and that it is 
committed to eliminate its backlog and speed up the process. Id at 61. However, in analyzing the 
likelihood of actually reaching these goals, the Strategic Plan falls short as it relies heavily on 
increased funding but does not include alternative plans if the funds do not materialize. Id. The 
Commission recognizes that its main strategy is receiving additional funding by stating that, “if 
the projected resources do not materialize or if only a portion of them materialize, the projection 
under this plan will have to be revisited.” STRATEGIC PLAN PART II, at 78. The Strategic Plan 
also fails to recognize that without significantly changing how petitions and cases are adjudicated, 
there is little reason to believe that the 2015 goals will be achieved even with additional funds. 
MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 62. The feasibility of these objectives also fails to 
consider capacity limitations of the staff, and overall lack of time of both Commissioners and 
staffers to consider the new number of intended reports without transforming the IACHR into a 
permanent body. David C. Steelman What Have We Learned About Court Delay, “Local Legal 
Culture,” And Caseflow Management Since The Late 1970s? 19 JUST. SYS. J. 145 (1997) at 159 
(stating that a court may reach a point of “saturation” after which other steps need to be taken).  
 163. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 47. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
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concentration of resources to the preliminary stages of the procedure 
and lengthened its overall duration.167 
Before 2000, the Commission generally ruled on both the 
admissibility and merits of a case in a single joint decision.168 In the new 
Rules of Procedure, the Commission created a two-stage process, 
requiring a separate report deciding whether petitions met the 
admissibility requirements.169 The Rules included a timeline for the 
submission of admissibility considerations that did not allow any 
extensions beyond three months, but they did not stipulate the 
consequences of the State’s failure to respond.170   
The effect of this change was felt immediately. Between 1996 and 
2001, the Commission adopted 146 independent admissibility 
determinations; between 2002 and 2007, that number almost doubled to 
275; and between 2008 and 2010 the IACHR adopted 175.171 Those 
increased numbers were not in addition to merits decisions, but to the  
detriment of them. The two-stage procedure shifted the concentration of 
the Commission decisions from joint admissibility and merits decisions 
to admissibility decisions.172 Fifty-four percent of the decisions adopted 
by the IACHR between 1996 and 2001 were admissibility decisions and 
46% were final decisions on the merits (including friendly settlement, 
merits decisions, and cases filed with the Court).173 Over the next eight 
years, the percentage of decisions on the merits and friendly settlements 
dropped to 17%, and 83% became admissibility or archival decisions.174  
If we add the cases submitted to the Court, 32% were fully decided 
while 68% of decisions were admissibility or archival.175 
 
 
 167. Id. 
 168. See MONICA PINTO, LA DENUNCIA ANTE LA COMISIÓN INTERAMERICANA DE 
DERECHOS HUMANOS 83 (Editores del Puerto 1994).  
 169. In part, the Commission was responding to the requests formulated by the States in the 
previous years. See Resolution AG/RES. 1701, supra note 103, art. 6.b (recommending the 
Commission to resolve “questions pertaining to the admissibility of individual petitions by 
opening a separate, mandatory procedure and issuing their findings by way of concise resolutions, 
the publication of which shall not prejudge the responsibility of the State”). 
 170. Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 51, art. 30.4. 
 171. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 47−48. 
 172. Id. at 49. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id.  
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When the Court issued separate decisions on preliminary objections, 
merits, and reparations, it took an average of two years and two months 
for a case to be fully resolved by the Court.188 Now that the Court has 
combined the decisions it takes an average of just over one year and 
seven months.189 Although the average time from when a petition is 
filed with the Commission to when it is decided by the Court increased 
by one year and five months after the Court combined its decisions, that 
increase actually represents an increase in the Commission’s process, 
not the Court’s.190 After the Court changed its procedure to combine 
decisions (and the Commission divided decisions at the same time), the 
average time that a petition or case spent in the Commission more than 
doubled, while the average time a case spent with the Court 
decreased.191  
Finally, the 2000 changes included, for the first time, a follow-up 
mechanism to monitor the implementation of the recommendations of 
the Commission included in its merits or friendly settlement reports.192  
 
B. 2009 Rules of Procedure Reforms 
In 2009, the Commission adopted a second set of revisions to its 
Rules of Procedure with the stated goals of enhancing “participation by 
victims, guarantees to harmonize procedural participation of the parties 
and enhance the publicity and transparency of the system.”193 Again, 
reducing the backlog or speeding-up the process were not official goals 
of the reforms.  
The reforms granted petitioners and States more time to submit 
additional observations on the merits.194 While the additional time may 
be necessary, it is usually used as a delaying mechanism by States and 
as such, is antithetical to the goal of reducing the length of the 
Commission’s procedure, unless this extension is aimed at ensuring 
timely substantive observations. Other provisions included a limitation 
 
 188. Id. at 74. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 51, art. 46. 
 193. Press Release, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., CIDH Publishes Its New Rules of Procedure, 
No. 84/09 (Dec. 9, 2009), available at http://www.cidh.org/Comunicados/English/2009/84-
09eng.html. 
 194. Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 51, arts. 37.1−37.2. 
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on when challenges to admissibility could be submitted195 and a 
provision allowing the receipt of testimony during on-site visits.196  
The Rules also included clear provisions for archiving cases.197 
Archiving petitions and cases reduces the backlog of the Commission 
because it eliminates inactive complaints from the docket of the 
Commission. Importantly, the Commission has begun to publish 
information on archival decisions only in the past two years.198  
Per the 2009 changes, the Commission may suspend the time limit 
to refer a case to the Court if the State in question is willing to 
implement the Commission’s recommendations and the State consents 
to the suspension.199 This provision, which reflects the previous 
unregulated practice of the IACHR, could represent a tension between 
the efficiency of the System and its effectiveness.200 Efficiency goes 
down by lengthening the procedure while the Commission waits to see 
if the State implements its recommendations.201 At the same time, 
compliance with the Commission’s decisions may increase because this 
provision offers the States an alternative to submission to the Court if 
the State complies with the Commission’s recommendations.202 
In addition, the 2009 reforms continue to elaborate on the 
functions of Working Groups. According to Articles 15 and 35, a 
Working Group on Admissibility shall be established to study, between 
sessions, the admissibility of petitions and make recommendations to 
the plenary.203 
In 2009, the Commission and the Court changed the way the 
Commission transfers a case to the Court.204 Prior to this, the 
Commission had to write a full legal brief with all legal arguments and 
evidence in order to submit a case to the Court. Now, when transferring 
a case to the Court, the Commission must only submit the merits report, 
the observations on the State’s answer to the report, and the reasons for 
submitting the case to the Court.205 The Court has also reduced the 
Commission’s role as advocate in Court proceedings and has given it 
 
 195. Id. art. 30.6. 
 196. Id. art. 39. 
 197. Id. art. 42. 
 198. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 53. 
 199. Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 51, art. 46. 
 200. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 53. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. at 54. 
 203. Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 51, arts. 15, 35. 
 204. Id. art. 74. 
 205. Id. 
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more of a neutral position.206 This change shifts the emphasis to the 
petitioner and the State as parties to the case.207 The Commission, 
however, still presents final observations after both parties have made 
oral arguments.208  
It is too early to judge whether the 2009 amendments will have an 
impact on the backlog and delays at the Commission level. If the 
Commission does not take a prominent role in the litigation of cases at 
the Court, if it is not required to prepare an additional brief to submit the 
case to the Tribunal, and if its role in the public hearings is more 
limited, it is possible that the Commission will be able to re-allocate 
some of its resources and time to deal with its backlog rather than to 
litigate in front of the Court.  
As previously stated, the Commission recently adopted a new set 
of revisions to its Rules. Again, those changes do not pursue any 
explicit measures to speed up the process nor to reduce the 
Commission’s backlog. In fact, the revisions extend some of the 
deadlines for the submissions of information. However, the 2013 
revisions provide some welcome clarity on some criteria, such as when 
the Commission may expedite the evaluation of a petition;209 criteria for 
joining the admissibility and merits stages;210 reasons for allowing the 
revision of an archival decision211 or considerations for the temporal 
suspension of the time limit to refer the case to the Court.212 
C.  Changes in the Executive Secretariat 
The Executive Secretariat of the IACHR is a “specialized unit of 
the General Secretariat of the Organization [that. . .] shall be provided 
with the resources required to accomplish the tasks assigned to it by the 
Commission.”213 As a permanent body (as opposed to the part-time 
nature of the Commissioners’ positions), the Executive Secretariat plays 
a fundamental and largely discretionary part in the Commission’s work 
processing individual petitions.214 The Executive Secretariat drafts all 
the petitions, case reports, and applications to the Court. Also the 
 
 206. INTER-AM. CT. H.R., Statement of Motives for the Reform of the Rules of Procedure, 2, 
available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/reglamento_eng.cfm. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. at 3. 
 209. See Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 51, art. 29.2. 
 210. See id. art. 36.3. 
 211. See id. art. 42. 
 212. See id. art. 46. 
 213. See id. art. 21.1. 
 214. David Harris, Regional Protection of Human Rights; The Inter-American Achievement, 
THE INTER-AM. SYS. OF H.R., 19 (David Harris and Stephen Livingstone eds., Oxford, 1998).  
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Secretariat is responsible for administering the process, as it receives 
and processes the correspondence on petitions and cases; the Secretariat 
requests parties to provide any information it deems relevant, fixes the 
deadlines for those submissions, and grants extensions to receive those 
responses.215 Crucially, the Commission has delegated to the Executive 
Secretariat the power to revise new complaints and to reject those that 
do not meet the prima facie normative requirements.216  
Since 2001, the Secretariat has undergone two phases of reform, 
with the goal of maximizing its output and better utilizing its limited 
resources.217 In the first phase, the main priority was to improve 
standardization and coherence within the legal work of the 
Commission.218 The Executive Secretariat created advisory groups that 
assisted in the review of initial petitions and in the assessment of 
requests for precautionary measures to ensure consistent standards 
across States. In 2004, the Executive Secretariat created the litigation or 
Court group responsible for supporting the Commission’s participation 
in Court proceedings.219  
The second phase of reorganization specifically targeted the 
efficiency of the case system.220 In 2007, the Executive Secretariat 
created four regional groups that consolidated the country desks.221 
Each regional group is responsible for handling outreach, observations, 
and on-site visits in their respective regions and States, as well as the 
processing of individual petitions, including drafting reports.222 This 
allowed for the even distribution of petitions and cases across regions, 
giving each group between 300 and 400 ongoing petitions and cases.223 
This arrangement enabled, in theory, attorneys within each regional 
group to specialize based on their seniority. Junior professionals were 
responsible for admissibility reports and senior professionals for merits 
reports.224 A senior specialist would coordinate and oversee the regional 
group.225 The regional sections would process petitions and cases, 
assess the observations by the parties, determine the need for additional 
 
 215. Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 51, art. 13; see also id. arts. 30, 37. 
 216. Id. arts. 26−27, 29. 
 217. Comm. on Jur. and Pol. Affairs, Permanent Council of the Organization of American 
States, Reorganization of the Executive Secretariat of the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights, CP/CAJP-2693/09 rev. 1 (Feb. 20, 2009) [hereinafter Reorganization]. 
 218. Id. 
 219. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 55. 
 220. Reorganization, supra note 217. 
 221. Id. at 1−2. 
 222. Id. at 1. 
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 225. Id. 
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information, and recommend the convening of hearings when 
necessary.226 These sections would also follow up on recommendations 
made by the Commission.227  
The Commission’s Secretariat created the Registry in March 2007, 
in order to address the large backlog of new petitions.228 As of October 
2008, the Secretariat transferred to this unit all of its new petitions 
waiting to be reviewed—a total of 4,471 petitions.229 Currently, the 
Registry reviews all new petitions in addition to the backlogged new 
petitions in chronological order.230 Thanks to additional funding from 
external sources to create the Registry, the Commission hired new staff 
and reallocated personnel from other stages of the case system process. 
The Commission’s plan was to reduce the delay in the initial stage by 
concentrating resources in the Registry for the first three years, and then 
once a more reasonable delay was achieved, the resources would be 
allocated elsewhere.231  
The Secretariat has recently created the Friendly Settlement Group, 
a specialized unit that will support Commissioners assigned to cases 
where the parties have agreed to enter into friendly settlement 
procedures.232 The Group will be in charge of tracking and facilitating 
the process, preparing the necessary reports, and providing general 
assistance to the Commissioners.233 Unfortunately, the Commission was 
only able to supply “rough estimates” of seventy to one hundred cases 
and petitions currently in friendly settlement negotiations.234 This raises 
concerns for planning and managing the status of each case and petition. 
It is particularly problematic for the Commission when forecasting the 
need for staff and resources.235 Friendly settlements increase efficiency 
 
 226. Comm. on Jur. and Pol. Affairs, Permanent Council of the Organization of American 
States, Reorganization of the Executive Secretariat of the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights, CP/CAJP-2693/09 rev. 1 (Feb. 20, 2009). 
 227. The Executive Secretariat also created a protection group to deal with precautionary 
measures. The protection group studies requests for precautionary measures and analyzes their 
necessity before making the pertinent recommendations to the Commission. Additionally, it 
handles the processing of those precautionary measures and follows up with the petitioner and the 
State after the measures have been requested. 
 228. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 56.  
 229. Id. at 20. 
 230. Id. at 56.  
 231. Id.   
 232. Id. at 59. 
 233. Id. at 60. 
 234. HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC, UNIV. OF TEXAS SCH. OF LAW, MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, 
MINIMIZING DELAY: STREAMLINING PROCEDURES OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS 60 (2011), 
http://www.utexas.edu/law/clinics/humanrights/work/Maximizing_Justice_Minimizing_Delay_at
_the_IACHR.pdf 
 235. Id. 
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by dealing with cases (or petitions) at earlier stages. Our data indicates 
that the average time between filing and settlement approval was almost 
five months shorter than the average time between filing and merits 
decisions, and almost two years shorter than the average time between 
filing and receiving a decision from the Court.236 Additionally, friendly 
settlements increase the effectiveness of the Commission. In a study of 
compliance with decisions in the Inter-American System, 54% of 
friendly settlements had total compliance by States, while only 29% of 
Court decisions and 11% of Commission reports were fully complied 
with.237 Additionally, like any method of alternative dispute resolution, 
friendly settlements can be more flexible than Commission and Court 
decisions.238  
The Secretariat has also implemented a variety of technological 
changes. In 2002 the Secretariat created the Petition and Case 
Management System (PCMS).239 The PCMS is an electronic database 
that tracks the progress of petitions and cases by making an electronic 
record for every procedural step, starting with the submission of a 
petition.240 The PCMS standardizes all of the communications between 
the Commission and the parties in petitions or cases by producing pre-
determined letters.241  
In May 2010 the Secretariat began using an electronic Document 
Management System (DMS) to track and file documents in the same 
way that it manages petitions and cases.242 The DMS digitizes and 
registers documents filed by either a party or the Commission, and it 
links the documents to the appropriate petition or case.243 The DMS 
eliminates the need to use paper by creating a fully electronic file for 
each petition or case, and by facilitating access to the documents within 
each file. The DMS facilitates oversight and monitoring by giving 
managers electronic access to pertinent documents for each stage of a 
petition or case.244 The DMS is limited to petitions and documents filed 
 
 236. Id. 
 237. Basch, supra note 137. 
 238. Permanent Council of the Organization of American States, Special Working Group to 
Reflect on the Workings of the IACHR With a View to Strengthening the IAHRS, OEA/Ser.G 
GT/SIDH/INF 41/11 (Dec. 2011) (presentation by the Executive Secretariat of the IACHR on 
“Friendly Settlements”). 
 239. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 57. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. at 58. 
 243. Id. 
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after June 2010, and there are currently no plans or resources to digitize 
earlier-filed documents.245  
The Executive Secretariat hopes to implement a “user portal” 
(”PPP”) that would initially allow States and parties to monitor the 
progress of their petition or case and view related documents.246 The 
eventual goal is to provide all petitioners and States access to 
information in the database that relates to their petition or case.247 The 
PPP offers the possibility of digitally notifying petitioners and States of 
IACHR decisions.248 
The Secretariat also has a process whereby petitions can be 
submitted online.249 After registering with the Commission’s website, 
petitioners can complete a petition by filling out the online form.250 
Upon submitting this form, petitioners immediately receive an 
automated follow-up email that simultaneously confirms the receipt of 
the electronic petition and requests the petitioner to mail a signed copy 
of the form.251 There are no public records of the number of new 
petitions submitted online.252  
 
 
 
 
 
 245. HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC, UNIV. OF TEXAS SCH. OF LAW, MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, 
MINIMIZING DELAY: STREAMLINING PROCEDURES OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS 58 (2011), 
http://www.utexas.edu/law/clinics/humanrights/work/Maximizing_Justice_Minimizing_Delay_at
_the_IACHR.pdf 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. 
 249. See Petition Form, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., available at 
https://www.cidh.oas.org/cidh_apps/instructions.asp?gc_language=E. 
 250. Id. 
 251. See Register, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., available at 
https://www.cidh.oas.org/cidh_apps/register.asp. 
 252. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 58. However, the Commission’s answers have 
provided its calculation. As of August 30, 2011, of a total of 1,030 petitions received, 308 have 
been received through the online formula (33%). The Commission estimates through a sampling 
of 100 consecutive petitions from which online petitions were withdrawn, that 37 were presented 
by e-mail. Using the Commission’s own formula, they estimate this to be 37% of petitions being 
received through e-mail translating to, “roughly 55%” of petitions received during the year being 
through electronic means. Id. 
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persistent lack of financial resources by seeking additional external 
funding.255 Indeed, in 2010 the Commission had a budget of just over $7 
million, with $3.4 million from donations and $4 million from the 
OAS.256  
The $4 million provided by the OAS only represented five of the 
total OAS 2010 Program Budget.257 The IACHR increased its external 
funding in 2007 and 2008.258  However, the global financial crisis has 
had an impact on the Commission’s ability to secure external funding.  
In 2010 member states donated approximately $500,000 less than in 
2009, with the United States reducing its funding by over $1,000,000.259 
In 2010, Canada was the biggest donor followed by the European 
Union.260  
Contributions by member states produce an apparent conflict of 
interest for the Commission, which must decide cases impartially with 
respect to those member states.261 Also, the funds from outside of the 
OAS budget are voluntary contributions, which depend on the priorities 
and financial abilities of funders, two factors that are variable.262 
Additionally, outside organizations and governments tend to commit 
new funds to special projects, rather than the core functions of the 
Commission, particularly the processing of petitions and cases.263 These 
targeted funds have created several political problems to the 
 
Comm’n H.R., IACHR Annual Report 1976, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.40, doc. 5, at ch. 1.D (June 7, 1977) 
(“The work of the Commission has been increasing in volume and in intensity due to the constant 
increase of denunciations of violations of human rights in various regions in the hemisphere and, 
as was already pointed out elsewhere, that increase in the work load has not been accompanied by 
a proportional enlargement of the means for handling it. The Commission still is limited to the 
staff and resources that it had several years ago.”).  
 255. STRATEGIC PLAN PART I, supra note 105, at 61. 
 256. Financial Resources 2010, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., available at 
http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2010eng/2010.Contributions.to.IACHR_certified.pdf. 
 257. Id. 
 258. See Financial Resources 2008, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., available at 
http://www.cidh.oas.org/pdf%20files/Participation%20of%20IACHR%20in%20the%202008 
%20OAS%20Budget_english.pdf. See also Financial Resources 2007, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., 
available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/recursos2007.eng.htm. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Financial Resources 2010, supra note 258. In 2010, of the $1,267,500 contributed by 
Member States, $748,600 was funded by Canada. The USA contributed the second highest 
amount, $400,000, while Colombia contributed $105,000, and Chile contributed $10,000. Finally, 
Costa Rica contributed $3,900 to the Commission. A large portion of the funding—$1,154,900— 
came from observer States, $700,400 of which came from Spain. The European Commission and 
other institutions, such as UNICEF and the Inter-American Development Bank, also contributed a 
significant portion. 
 261. James L. Cavallaro & Stephanie Erin Brewer, Reevaluating Regional Human Rights 
Litigation in the Twenty-First Century: The Case of the Inter-American Court, 102 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 768, 783 (2008).  
 262. Id. 
 263. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28. 
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Commission as it has being accused of focusing only on the agenda and 
interests of some funders (particularly of some States) and prioritizing 
only some issues.264 More importantly, as the last couple of years show, 
this additional funding may not be sustainable.265  
As a result of underfunding, the Commission cannot hire the 
necessary staff.266 Currently the Commission has thirty-seven 
professionals and eighteen administrative staff.267 Nevertheless, the 
Executive Secretary has said that “in order to have a healthy and strong 
system of individual cases that functions [. . .] on a timely basis, a total 
of 87 professionals and 25 administrative assistants are needed.”268 
Moreover, over 50% of the Commission’s staff is currently financed by 
external cooperation funds.269  
In addition to the lack of resources, there are difficulties within the 
Commission’s process that contribute to the delays and backlog. First, 
the Commission does not use its online petition system to its full 
potential. If a petitioner submits an online petition, he or she still must 
submit a signed paper copy. On some occasions, the Executive 
Secretariat registers these multiple submissions separately and with 
inconsistent dates in the Commission’s reports.270 If the petition is 
 
 264. See for instance the position of Ecuador. OAS, Permanent Council, Working Group, 
Proposals by the Delegation of Ecuador, Doc. OEA/Ser.G/GT/SIDH/INF.46/11 (Dec. 5, 2011) 
(proposing that the OAS finance the Commission from its own resources, and until this goal is 
achieved, the Commission should establish a policy that voluntary contributions it receives cannot 
be conditioned or earmarked and that the Commission should correct the imbalance of economic 
and human resources in its rapporteurships). See also OAS, General Assembly, Resolution 
Results of the Process of Reflection on the Workings of the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights with a View to Strengthening the Inter-American Human Rights System, AG/RES. 
1 (XLIV-E/13) corr. 1 (adopted at the plenary session, held on Mar. 22, 2013 and subject to 
revision by the Style Committee) (inviting member states, observer states, and other institutions 
to continue making voluntary contributions, preferably not earmarked). See generally, Ruiz-
Chiriboga, Oswaldo R., Is Ecuador That Wrong?: Analyzing the Ecuadorian Proposals 
Concerning the Special Rapporteurship on Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, 20 HUMAN RIGHTS BRIEF 2 (2013), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2034375 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2034375. 
 265. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28. For instance in 2008, the IACHR received 
$5,045,000 in voluntary contributions. Five years later, in 2012, the contributions were reduced to 
$3,982,600. In 2011, the voluntary contributions rose to their pick in 2011 amounting $5,135,200. 
But in 209 and 2010 they suffered a sharp decrease as they were only $4,329,800 and $3,354,700 
respectively. See Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Financial Resources, ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN 
STATES, http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/financial_resources.asp. 
 266. Id. at 22. 
 267. Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Composition of the IACHR 2010, 
http://www.cidh.oas.org/personal.eng.htm.  
 268. Presentation of the Executive Sec’y, supra note 120, at 7.  
 269. Id. at 5.  
 270. See, e.g., Jimenez v. Costa Rica, Petition No. 12.136, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report 
No. 97/10, ¶¶ 1, 4 (July 12, 2010), available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/casos/10.eng.htm. (“On 
May 12, 1998, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights received a petition presented by  
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registered multiple times, then valuable resources are wasted as lawyers 
may begin to process a petition twice, duplicating the intake process. 
Even if the petition were not registered twice, the Commission would 
still need to read all the different and subsequent versions to be sure that 
they are the same. The advantage of an online system is that the 
Commission automatically has a digital version of the petition, reducing 
processing time.271 Of course, due to the lack of universal Internet 
access throughout the Americas, a purely online system cannot for the 
time being be fully implemented as it would limit access to the IACHR 
for some people.  
The current petition intake system encourages too many petitions 
that cannot be processed. Information on how to file a petition is 
publicly available in a new brochure and on the Commission’s website; 
however, it is limited to the Rules, contains some legalistic 
explanations, and does not provide enough specific examples of what 
could be processed by the Commission and what claims are manifestly 
outside of its jurisdiction.272 This lack of more user-friendly information 
may account for some of the almost 90% of petitions summarily 
dismissed by the Executive Secretariat.273 The backlog of petitions 
waiting for initial review largely consists of petitions that are 
insufficient to pass through the pre-screening phase, preventing 
legitimate claims from receiving the Commission and its Secretariat’s 
attention.274  
The way by which petitioners and States submit information and 
evidence contributes to the delays.275 Currently, petitioners submit 
evidence with the initial petition. They may later submit additional 
information to meet the requirements of the Rules, pursuant to Article 
26.2, and may even later submit additional information and evidence in 
written form or via a hearing, pursuant to Article 30.5.276 Once the case 
is opened, the petitioner can submit another set of observations and 
evidence (this time on the merits of the case, under Article 37.1), and 
later the petitioner has yet one last opportunity to present evidence by 
 
Seguismundo Gerardo Porras Jiménez . . . [t]he petition was received by the IACHR on August 
27, 1998.”). 
 271. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 39. 
 272. Sistema De Peticiones Y Casos: Folleto Inforativo [System of Petitions and Cases: 
Information Brochure], ORGANIZACIÓN DE ESTADOS AMERICANOS, available at 
http://www.oas.org/es/cidh/docs/folleto/CIDHFolleto_esp.pdf. 
 273. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 40. 
 274. In 2010, a total of 1676 petitions were evaluated, with only 275 receiving a decision to 
process (deemed receivable). Annual Report 2010, supra note 106, at 33 (chart e). 
 275. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 40. 
 276. Id. 
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request of the Commission (Article 37.4).277 Likewise, the State presents 
its information and evidence on admissibility to the Commission after 
the IACHR initially transfers the petition to the State.278 The State has a 
second opportunity to present evidence in writing or in hearing,279 a 
third chance to submit additional observations on the merits,280 and a 
fourth opportunity to present evidence in a hearing.281  
In addition to all these explicit procedures afforded by the Rules, 
the Commission may request or permit States and petitioners to submit 
information and evidence at multiple stages, beyond what the Rules 
require.282 For instance, in the Mateo Bruno petition, in the admissibility 
stage alone, petitioners submitted eight briefs and the State filed nine 
briefs with impressive gaps and silences in between.283 Petitioners did 
not submit anything between November 1998 and May 2004 or between 
July 2004 and May 2010.284 The State maintained silence between 
February 1999 and September 2010.285  
This practice might be encouraged or required by the current 
backlog. Since petitions and cases are already waiting in docket, 
requiring early submission of evidence may be seen as arbitrary. 
Furthermore, after years of delays, part of the information and 
arguments may become outdated as the factual situation of the case 
evolves286 and Inter-American case law or practice develops. For 
instance a law could be adopted or modified, a judicial case may have 
been opened or concluded, or some State actions could have been 
carried out.287 On the other hand, allowing late submissions of 
information and evidence encourages parties to withhold information 
that could reveal the strengths and weaknesses of their cases. Such 
withholding might prevent the Commission from drafting reports earlier 
 
 277. Id. 
 278. Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 51, art. 30.3. 
 279. Id. art. 30.5. 
 280. Id. art. 30.7. 
 281. Id. art. 65. 
 282. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 40. 
 283. Bruno v. Peru, Petition No. 10.949, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 69/11, ¶ 5 
(2011).  
 284. Id. 
 285. Id. 
 286. OAS Working Group, supra note 15, at 3. The OAS Working Group recommended the 
Commission to “[p]rovide factual updates on initial petitions that are transmitted to states a 
considerable time after registration or in the event of long periods of procedural inactivity.” Id.  
 287. For example, in the Yean and Bossico case, the State, after three years of procedures in 
front of the Commission, granted the birth 
certificates to the children, one of the main complaints in the case. The Yean and Bosico Children 
v. Dominican Republic, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 130, ¶ 25 (Sept. 8, 2005). 
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and, in some situations, from encouraging parties to enter into friendly 
settlement negotiations.288  
Most of the time, the Commission acts passively, transmitting 
communications between the parties back and forth rather than 
managing the process.289 In those communications, the IACHR 
mechanically requires additional information when both parties may 
have already submitted all the factual documentation and fully 
presented their legal arguments.290  
The Commission is also inconsistent in its use of rules that may 
speed up the process.291 For example, amended Article 36.3, which 
allows the Commission to combine the decisions on admissibility and 
merits in exceptional circumstances, is not consistently applied and it is 
unclear why it is applied in some cases and not others.292 For example, 
in 2010, the Commission decided two Brazilian cases in which the 
Government had not presented any allegations challenging the 
admissibility of the petitions. Nevertheless, the Commission took 
absolutely opposite approaches in dealing with those two cases. Petition 
12.308 was filed with the Commission on May 22, 2000. Ten months 
later, on March 22, 2001, petition 12.378 was filed. In both cases, the 
State did not respond to the petition. On March 17, 2010, the 
Commission adopted Report 37/10, on the admissibility and merits of 
petition/case 12.308. In that case, due to the silence of the State, the 
Commission decided to join the admissibility to the merits of the case. 
Two weeks earlier, on March 3, 2010, the Commission declared Petition 
12.378 admissible. Even though the State was equally silent in this 
petition, the Commission did not join the admissibility to the merits 
without explaining this inconsistency.293 
The Commission does not provide any written explanation for 
most of its procedural decisions.294 The lack of publicly reasoned 
 
 288. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 41. 
 289. Id. at 68. 
 290. Id. 
 291. Id. 
 292. Amended Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 51, art. 36.4.  
 293. See Manoel Leal de Oliveira v. Brazil, Case No. 12.308, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., 
Report No. 37/10 ( 2010), available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/casos/10.eng.htm; Fátima Regina 
Nascimento de Oliveira and Maura Tatiane Ferreira Alves v. Brazil, Petition No. 12.378, Inter-
Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 7/10,  ¶ 14 (2010), available at 
http://www.cidh.oas.org/casos/10.eng.htm. 
 294. The Commission does not publicly state the reasons for convening or denying a hearing 
nor the reasons for calling witnesses or the purpose of their testimonies. This is a contrast with the 
practice of the Court. See, e.g., Liakat Ali Alibux v. Suriname, Provisional Measures, Order of the 
President of the Court (Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. Dec. 20, 2012), available at 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/asuntos/Liakat.pdf.    
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decisions regarding procedural issues295 is a persistent obstacle in 
evaluating and understanding the Commission’s process. For instance, 
the Commission stated that it now deals with petitions and cases in 
chronological order, but some petitions and cases receive priority and 
are put in a fast track.296 The Commission has established that it should 
give priority status to 10% of new petitions and immediately evaluate 
them.297 Nevertheless, there is no public document discussing how the 
Commission decides to give priority to certain petitions or cases over 
others.298 The Commission explained that in order to understand or 
identify the criteria, one needs to look to individual cases already 
decided as a guide.299 While this may be possible for certain aspects of 
the procedure and certain users of the System, for many petitioners, 
 
 295. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 42. Besides the admissibility and merits reports 
themselves. 
 296. Id. at 43. 
 297. STRATEGIC PLAN PART II, supra note 162, at 75. 
 298. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 43. In the recent 2013 revised Rules, the 
Commission corrected this problem. Under revised Article 29.2:  
The petition shall be studied in the order it was received; however, the 
Commission may expedite the evaluation of a petition in situations such as 
the following:  
a. when the passage of time would deprive the petition of its 
effectiveness, in particular:  
i.  when the alleged victim is an older person or a 
child;  
ii.  when the alleged  victim is terminally ill;  
iii. when it is alleged that the death penalty could be 
applied to the presumed victim; or  
iv. when the object of the petition is connected to a 
precautionary or provisional measure in effect;  
b. when the alleged victims are persons deprived of liberty;  
c. when the State formally expresses its intention to enter into a 
friendly settlement process in the matter; or  
d. when any of the following circumstances are present: 
i. the decision could have the effect of repairing serious 
structural situations that would have an impact in the 
enjoyment of human rights; or  
ii. the decision could promote changes in legislation or 
state practices and avoid the reception of multiple 
petitions on the same matter.  
Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Consultation 2013 on Module I: Draft Reform of the Rules, art. 29.2 
(2013), available at http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/consultation2013/1_rules.asp#29 [hereinafter 
Draft Reform of Rules]. 
 299. Commission’s Answers, supra note 58. The OAS Working Group recommended the 
Commission to “[c]ontinue to develop objective criteria for setting priorities regarding treatment 
of petitions and other cases, considering the nature, complexity, and impact of the alleged 
situations.” OAS Working Group, supra note 15, at 3.A.h. 
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such a wealth of documentation would be overwhelming.300 What 
published reports are available do not provide information on basic 
questions such as why the Commission granted extensions, requested 
additional information, or decided not to join the admissibility with the 
merits. Moreover, existing published reports do not explain the 
procedural decisions made in the thousands of petitions and cases in the 
Commission’s docket.301  
With very few exceptions302 there are no deadlines for the adoption 
of any of the Commission’s decisions.303 As a quasi-judicial body, the 
Commission needs to have flexibility in the way and order in which it 
processes petitions to accommodate the needs of the victims, encourage 
State engagement and cooperation, facilitate friendly settlements, and 
strengthen the possibilities of the IACHR’s impact. Strict procedural 
deadlines or a ritualistic management of its procedure could hamper its 
effectiveness.304 But reasonable timeliness, consistency and 
transparency should not necessarily mean losing its flexibility.305 
The procedures set up in the Convention require the cooperation of 
the State to resolve cases. There is a mechanism that is designed to 
encourage the State to settle the matter before it is brought to the 
Court.306 Most of the procedures before the IACHR depends on “the 
willingness of the government to cooperate in the investigation and to 
take the necessary steps to resolve it.”307  The IACHR has used its 
 
 300. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 43. 
 301. Claudio Grossman, Strengthening the Intra-American Human Rights System: The 
Current Debate, 92 Proc. Ann. Meetings (Am. Soc’y Int’l. L.) 186, 188 (1998). (explaining that 
the Commission does not have a transparent system to grant hearings, admit cases for processing 
or follow up initiated submissions. Equally, there are currently no deadlines for the Commission 
to review the admissibility or merits of any given case. As a result, petitioners often do not know 
the procedural status of their claims which, in turn, affects their opportunity to be competently 
and timely represented.) 
 302. “If the friendly settlement referred to in Articles 44-51 of the Convention is not reached, 
the Commission shall draft, within 180 days, the report required by Article 50 of the 
Convention.” Commission Statute, supra note 50, art. 23.2. But even this explicit deadline is 
routinely ignored by the Commission. See, e.g., Juan José López, Case 11.395 Inter-Am. Comm’n 
H.R., Report No. 73/11, ¶ 9 (2011) (stating that on May 17, 2001, the State reported that it was 
unable to find grounds for commencing friendly settlement proceedings, and it reiterated that 
communication on July 10, 2001. The IACHR approved the merits report ten years later). 
 303. See OAS Comm. on Jur. and Pol. Affairs Results, CP/CAJP 2665/08 rev. 8 corr. 3 (Mar. 
18 2009)  at 11[hereinafter OAS Results] (finding that “the IACHR Rules of Procedure do not 
provide for any deadlines to be met by the IACHR in the initial processing, admissibility, or 
merits phases”; that the current lack of deadlines “may generate legal uncertainty among all 
players” and it is “one of many reasons for delays in issuing rulings” and finally that the 
“uncertainty regarding deadlines undermines the legitimacy of and confidence in the system.”). 
 304. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 43. 
 305. Id.  
 306. Id. at 65. 
 307. Velasquez Rodríguez Case, Preliminary Objections, ¶ 60. 
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procedures flexibly while trying to obtain State cooperation.308 The 
flexibility of IACHR procedures has allowed the IACHR to engage in 
productive dialogue with governments, even in the darkest days of the 
region.309 By leveraging the shifting degrees of intensity applied at 
various stages of the procedure, and diplomacy outside the strict limits 
of the procedure, the Commission has sought, and quite often achieved, 
cooperation from reluctant States to solve specific situations.310  
For instance, in 1995, in the Villatina massacre case, the parties 
initiated the process to reach a friendly settlement.311 For almost three 
years, the Commission facilitated the establishment of the Committee to 
Promote the Administration of Justice, for this and other cases, and 
created a follow-up committee to monitor the recommendations made 
by the promotion committee.312 As part of this process, in 1998, the 
Colombian President acknowledged the State had international 
responsibility for the massacre and “handed to the families of each 
victim a document as a testimony of moral redress and atonement.”313 
Nevertheless, the parties decided to terminate the friendly settlement 
process because the Government failed to comply with most of the 
agreements.314 The Commission continued to process the case and on 
November 16, 2001, approved a preliminary merits report and notified 
the State.315  
In February 2002, in view of the IACHR’s recommendations, a 
new Colombian Government expressed its willingness to start up new 
talks with the petitioners.316 The Commission let the parties engage with 
each other once again despite the fact that the Rules do not contemplate 
a friendly settlement at this stage of the process, and that Article 50 of 
the Convention presupposes the failure of the friendly settlement 
process.317 In the end, on July 29, 2002, the parties signed a very 
comprehensive friendly settlement agreement.318 The flexibility and 
 
 308. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 65. 
 309. Id.  
 310. Id.  
 311. Villatina Massacre, Friendly Settlement, Case 11.141, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report 
No. 105/05, rev. ¶ 6 (2005), available at 
http://cidh.org/annualrep/2005eng/Colombia11141eng.htm. 
 312. Id. 
 313. Id. ¶ 8. 
 314. Id. ¶ 9. 
 315. Id. ¶ 10. 
 316. Id. ¶ 11. 
 317. American Convention, supra note 7, art. 50 (stating that “if a settlement is not reached, 
the Commission shall . . . draw up a report setting forth the facts and stating its conclusions.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 318. Villatina Massacre, Friendly Settlement, ¶¶ 3−12.  
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willingness of the Commission to go around and beyond the text of the 
Convention and its own Rules allowed the parties to settle a matter with 
a far-reaching agreement. Although the process took seven years to 
conclude, it allowed the Commission to reengage with a new 
Government and, crucially, secure integral reparations for the victims.319  
The one negative consequence of the Commission’s flexibility is 
that States have taken advantage of their situational cooperation with the 
Commission. The treatment of the procedure as a flexible framework, 
rather than a clear set of rules, has had a negative impact on many cases 
and hindered the rights of victims to obtain a timely decision, resulting 
in high levels of procedural uncertainty.  
VII. BACKLOG, DELAYS AND THE EFFECTIVENESS  
AND EFFICIENCY OF THE COMMISSION 
The Commission needs to find a proper balance between 
effectiveness and efficiency in order to deal with its backlog and 
procedural delays. While the Commission’s effectiveness could be 
hampered by not processing enough complaints within a reasonable 
amount of time, a more efficient adjudication process cannot be 
achieved at the expense of the Commission’s overall effectiveness.  
In order to analyze whether a proper balance has been struck, the 
goals of the Commission need to be identified. The IACHR’s goals 
offer the framework by which it is possible to evaluate and measure 
efficiency and efficacy. The different perspectives through which the 
effectiveness of an intergovernmental human rights mechanism can be 
analyzed reflect the different conceptions of the goals of such a 
system.320 It is not possible to argue whether or not the Commission is 
effective without some baseline or reference to measure its effectiveness 
against.  
Thus, in order to assess the effectiveness of a system, including the 
Inter-American, one has to identify its aims or goals—the desired 
 
 319. Luis Manuel Lasso-Lozano, Algunas reflexiones sobre el trámite de soluciones 
amistosas por parte de Colombia ante el Sistema Interamericano de Protección de los Derechos 
Humanos, SIDH (1994–97), 18 Int’l Law, Revista Colombiana de Derecho Internacional, 89–116 
(2011). 
 320. See also Centre of Human Rights Education (ZMRB) of the PHZ Lucerne, Report: 
Lucerne Academic Consultation on Strengthening the United Nations Treaty Body System, 4 
(2011) (stating that “while there may be many ways in which the system might be made more 
‘efficient’ (e.g. [sic] by reducing the number of reports or limiting the scope of opportunities for 
civil society engagement), such steps might not be appropriate if other goals (such as enhancing 
opportunities for civil society engagement in reporting procedures) are viewed as important to the 
system. Deciding which of the proposed changes should be pursued must involve measuring them 
against the overall purposes of the system and asking whether they would be likely to promote 
those purposes.”). 
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outcomes that it ought to generate—“and ascertain a reasonable time 
frame for meeting some or all of these goals.”321 In the leading study on 
the effectiveness of supranational adjudication, Slaughter and Helfer 
recognize that “defining effectiveness . . . inevitably requires asking the 
question ‘effective for what purpose?’ - an inquiry that will in turn 
depend on a prior conception of the functions of specific courts within 
specific legal systems.”322 “These functions . . . may conflict with one 
another; they may also each generate a different metric of 
effectiveness.”323 From this perspective, Steiner discussing the “burst of 
[human rights] commissions, committees and courts;” has inquired, for 
example: “[W]hat purposes should such forms of international dispute 
resolution between individuals and their state of nationality serve? What 
goals should give direction to these innovative processes? Are there 
generally valid answers to these . . . questions, or will answers 
necessarily vary with context?”324  
There are theoretical and practical challenges in attempting to 
respond to these questions. The theoretical difficulty is that there has 
been little analysis regarding the goals of human rights systems in 
general and in the Inter-American system in particular.325 The practical 
 
 321. Yuval Shany, Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts: A Goal Based 
Approach, 106 AM. J. INT’L L., 225, 230 (2012).  
 322. Anne-Marie Slaughter & Laurence Helfer, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational 
Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J., 273, 282 (1997). 
 323. Id. at 202 (stating that the definition of what effectiveness or success means appears to 
be a controversial issue, not only in the sphere of human rights, but in international law in 
general); David López, Dispute Resolution Under NAFTA: Lessons from the Early Experience, 
32 TEX. INT’L L.J. 163, 200 (1997) (defining what constitutes "success" in the context of dispute 
resolution under NAFTA is extremely controversial). 
 324. Henry Steiner, Individual Claims in a World of Massive Violations: What role for the 
Human Rights Committee?, in THE FUTURE OF THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY MONITORING 
15, 16 (Philip Alston & James Crawford eds., 2000).  The references in this article to other human 
rights bodies and courts are meant to provide ideas on how to frame these issues or think about 
potential reform of the Commission’s procedure. As I discussed in the text, due to the unique 
goals and functions of the Commission as a human rights body with multiple tasks, including 
quasi-judicial adjudicatory tasks, and the context in which it operates, there are limitations to the 
comparisons. I do not mention other Courts and bodies to measure the Commission’s 
performance against them. On the contrary, the reference to other bodies is in part in order to 
delineate and justify what would be the proper differences between the Commission and the other 
bodies. The use of other bodies’ experiences is also intended to distinguish the way in which the 
Commission’s procedural practices justifiably differ from other similar bodies. It is used to 
highlight the peculiarities and strengths as well as the weaknesses of Commission Rules and 
practices. See also Paolo Carozza, Advocacy Before Regional Human Rights Bodies: A Cross-
Regional Agenda, 59 AM. U.L. REV., 163, 215 (2008). 
 325. Davis and Werner had identified four purposes of an international court that hears 
human rights cases from post-conflict democracies, including the Inter-American Court.  First, it 
should operate to deter future violations with rulings that equip people to call for accountability.  
Second, it should facilitate the legal and moral condemnation of human rights violations. Third, 
its jurisprudence should transcend the parties in the case in order to express the normative value  
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difficulty is that there is no consensus among the different actors with 
respect to those goals,326 and no attempt to identify them. In addition, as 
with any international adjudicatory body, the Commission has diverse 
goals that reflect the expectations of different internal and external 
constituencies.327 This article emphasizes the Commission’s broader 
mandate and its main goal is to promote and protect human rights.328 
Thus, the Commission could only be effective if its case system 
reflected and sought to achieve this larger aim. But as a body with 
quasi-judicial, promotional, diplomatic, and political functions, the 
IACHR tends to fulfill several different and specific goals that, at times, 
could contradict each other. The way it designs and administers its case 
system is informed, constrained and limited by all the different and 
sometimes competing goals. Thus, the IACHR can be effective if its 
case system advances most of its goals most of the time. 
In its most limited way, effective adjudication could be defined in 
terms of an adjudicatory body’s “ability to compel or cajole compliance 
with its” decisions.329 In order to be effective, supranational tribunals 
and quasi-judicial bodies in their adjudicatory role must ensure 
compliance by convincing domestic governments to act in accord with 
their rulings.330 Thus, as a starting and limited point, both the problems 
of delay and backlog and the possible responses to them should be 
considered in terms of their impact on the ability of the Commission to 
compel compliance with its decisions in individual cases. In fact, the 
only quantitative study on the level of compliance with decisions of the 
Commission and the Court makes explicit references to the duration of 
the procedure as a relevant factor to take into consideration.331 But, as 
the Inter-American system in general, and the case system in particular, 
has several different goals,332 compliance with its recommendations or 
 
of justice and equality under the law to broad classes of victims. Fourth, it should establish 
knowledge of past actions committed under color of law and create a historical record. Edward 
Warner & Jeffery Davis, Reaching Beyond the State: Judicial Independence, the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights and Accountability in Guatemala, J. HUM. RTS. 6, No. 2, 233–55 (2007). 
 326. See EL FUTURO, supra note 23, at 9 (stating there the System confronts an identity crisis 
as there is a fundamental disagreement among the main actors on the current legal and political 
direction of the System). 
 327. Shany, supra note 321, at 233. 
    328.American Convention, supra note 7, art. 41. “There shall be an Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, whose principal function shall be to promote the observance and 
protection of human rights and to serve as a consultative organ of the Organization in these 
matters.” OAS Charter supra note 49, art. 106. 
 329. Slaughter & Helfer, supra note 322, at 110.  
 330. Id.  
 331. Basch, supra note 137, at 26.  
 332. Lea Shaver, The Inter-American Human Rights System: An Effective Institution for 
Regional Rights Protection?, 9  WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 639, 665 (2010). The 
effectiveness of an international tribunal may be judged in several aspects, not all of which are  
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with decisions of the Commission and Court is only one element to take 
into consideration when assessing the System’s effectiveness.333 
We believe that a human rights system would be effective if it is 
able to achieve reasonable goals given the economic, social and political 
setting within which it operates; the nature of the violations it has to 
handle; and the powers granted in service of its supervisory function.334 
The context sets not only the possibilities of the System but also 
conditions its goals.335 In this regard, both to assess the effectiveness of 
the Commission and the way in which it handles individual complaints, 
there is a need to have some understanding of what goals the Inter-
American system seeks to meet by establishing an individual complaint 
mechanism and the context in which operates.336  
The goals of the Commission in its adjudicatory process337 are: i) 
the protection of individuals,338 ii) raising awareness339 and serving as an 
 
easily measured. In simple terms, a court's effectiveness may be measured by the number of cases 
it resolves, and whether the orders that it issues are in fact followed. Ultimately, however, human 
rights tribunals exist in large part to achieve much broader effects. 
 333. See Huneeus, supra note 1, at 505 (stating that implementation is not the only and 
arguably not the most significant potential outcome of a court ruling). In fact, compliance is 
distinct from, although related to, questions of effectiveness.  For instance, international regimes 
could have high rates of compliance with very low and ineffective standards. Par Engstrom, 
Effectiveness of International and Regional Human Rights Regimes, THE INT’L STUDIES 
ENCYCLOPEDIA 5 (Robert A. Denemark ed., 2010).  
 334. A. GLENN MOWER, JR., REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE 
WEST EUROPEAN AND INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEMS 164 (1991).  
 335. See Sergio Garcia Ramirez, Judge, Inter-Am. Ct. of H.R., Address at the Conference: 
Advocacy Before Regional Human Rights Bodies: A Cross-Regional Agenda (Oct. 20, 2008) 
(stating that it is not necessary to impose on each human rights system the rules and regulations of 
the other, because each works within circumstances and conditions that are sometimes profoundly 
different; the achievements of each system are within the circumstances of each). 
 336. Shany, supra note 321, at 231.   
 337. Steiner had speculated that the Human Rights Committee in its adjudicatory capacity 
could serve any of all of three purposes associated with adjudicatory bodies in general: (a) doing 
justice in the individual case; (b) protecting rights through deterrence and related behavior 
modification; and (c) “expounding, elucidating, interpreting and explaining the Covenant so as to 
engage Committee in an ongoing, fruitful dialogue with states parties, non-governmental and 
intergovernmental institutions, advocates, scholars and students.” Steiner supra note 324, at 31. 
Shany has identified four generic goals that all or almost international courts have been encourage 
to achieve: 1. Promoting compliance with the governing international norms; 2. Resolving 
international disputes and specific problems; 3. Contributing to the operation of related 
institutional and normative regimes and 4. Legitimizing associated international norms and 
institutions. Shany, supra note 321, at 244−46. 
 338. The American Declaration Preamble establishes that the “international protection of the 
rights of man should be the principal guide of an evolving American Law.” Declaration, supra 
note 44, at 1. Similarly, the Convention creates the Commission and the Court as “[m]eans of 
Protection.” American Convention, supra note 7, at Part II. Therefore, the Court as well as the 
Commission has an obligation to preserve all of the remedies that the Convention affords victims 
of violations of human rights so that they are accorded the protection to which they are entitled 
under the Convention. Gallardo et al. v. Costa Rica, Provisional Measures, Order of the President  
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early warning system,340 iii) establishing human rights standards,341 iv) 
creation of a democratic forum to discuss human rights issues342 and v) 
 
of the Court, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. G, ¶ 15 (July 15, 1981). This could be the “official” 
goal of the System as put forth in the official document that could be distinguished from the 
operative goals of the System. Shany, supra note 321, at 231.  See also Basch, supra note 137 
(stating that the variety of the remedies adopted by the IACHR and the Inter-American Court 
seems to confirm the widespread vision that the objectives sought by the Inter-American System 
are, with relatively few exceptions, to make reparations to affected persons or groups and to give 
protection to victims and witnesses). The International Coalition of Human Rights Organizations 
of the Americas has stated that “the primary objective of the [system] is not to achieve an abstract 
ideal of justice, but rather to guarantee protection of human dignity without distinction and to see 
justice done for specific victims of human rights violations.” OAS Coalition Observations, 
OAE/Ser.G CP/INF 6386/12 (Jan. 25, 2012) [hereinafter Coalition Observations].  But not all 
agree with this position. For instance, in the African context it was argued that while the African 
human rights court should protect individuals, it “should not be viewed as a forum for offering 
individual justice to victims of human rights violations.” While such a goal is certainly noble, it is 
by all means impossible.” Makau Mutua W., The African Human Rights Court: A Two-Legged 
Stool?, 21 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY 342–63, 361 (1999). In Europe, the discussion on how to 
deal with the backlog crisis of the European Court has focused on whether the Court should 
“provide ‘individual’ or ‘constitutional’ justice. Advocates of the former view argue that the right 
of individual petition is the centerpiece of the [European system requiring the Court to hear every 
case] and provide a remedy to every individual whose human rights have been violated. 
Proponents of the [constitutional justice] position argue, [similar to Steiner’s position with regard 
to the Human Rights Committee, that the European Court] should concentrate on providing ‘fully 
reasoned and authoritative [decisions] in cases which raise substantial or new and complex issues 
of human rights law, which are of particular significance for the State concerned or involve 
allegations of serious human rights violations and which warrant a full process of considered 
adjudication.’” Helfer supra note 22, at 127. 
 339. The Convention specifically provides that one of the activities of the IACHR is to 
“develop an awareness of human rights among the peoples of America.” American Convention, 
supra note 7, art. 41.1. See Tom J. Farer, The Rise of the Inter-American Human Rights Regime: 
No Longer a Unicorn, Not Yet an Ox, 19 HUM. RTS. Q. 510, 524 (1997) (In the case system, this 
goal could mean paying closer attention to cases representing structural problems or cases that 
give visibility to traditionally marginalized issues or groups.). 
 340. See generally Santiago Canton, AMNESTY LAWS, IN VICTIMS UNSILENCED: THE INTER-
AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN LATIN AMERICA (2007) 
(stating that “[t]he IACHR’s mandate to receive complaints of human rights violations has 
enabled it . . . to acquire a detailed understanding of situations involving large-scale human rights 
abuses. It can then take swift action to alert the international community about these situations. 
Known as “early warning,” this is perhaps the most important function of the IACHR, as it 
provides an avenue for timely intervention by the international community to prevent the 
continuation of massive violations of human rights.”). See also Claudio Grossman, Strengthening 
the Intra-American Human Rights System: The Current Debate, 92 Proc. Ann. Meetings, AM. 
SOC’Y INT’L. L. 188 (1998) (indicating that “the case system’s approach is particularly effective 
because it performs a preventive role and serves as an early-warning function: a single violation 
could be the first indication of the beginning of a process that, if allowed to proceed, will result in 
regression back to an authoritarian structure”.) For a similar argument in Europe, see Helfer, 
supra note 22, at 129 (arguing that “national Governments established the Convention as an early 
warning system to sound the alarm in case Europe’s fledgling democracies began to backslide 
toward totalitarianism”). 
 341. See, e.g., Victor Abramovich, The Rights-Based Approach in Development Policies and 
Strategies, 88 CEPAL REV. 33 (Apr. 2006) (arguing that the rulings by the Commission and the 
Court “on a particular case have a heuristic value, as interpretations of the treaties by which 
conflict should be governed, that transcends the particular cases of the immediate victims”). The 
Inter-American case law serves as a guide for subsequent domestic rulings by national courts.   
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legitimization of actors.343 Informed by these many goals, the processing 
of individual complaints and the decisions that result produce ripple 
effects, both in the domestic sphere and in the international system. 
These effects are important in defining the goals of the Inter-American 
system, assessing its effectiveness, and analyzing and dealing with its 
delay and backlog. Not all effects or goals344 are solely, or even mainly, 
tied to the degree of compliance with the IACHR’s decisions.  
The Commission (and the Court) has “sought not only to 
compensate the victims in individual cases” (which would require 
compliance with their decisions), “but also to establish a body of 
principles and standards, with the objective of influencing” domestic 
democratic processes and strengthening national protection 
mechanisms.345 The Commission’s (and Court’s) influence however, 
does not limit itself to the impact of their jurisprudence on local courts. 
The Commission (and the Court) pursues the processing and resolution 
of individual cases, to persuade States to formulate policies to redress 
the situation giving rise to each case, and to address the structural 
 
For the African context, see Mutua arguing for the African Court to hear only those cases that 
have the potential to expound on the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights and make 
law that would guide African States in developing legal and political cultures that respect human 
rights. See also Mutua, supra note 338, at 362; Steiner, supra note 324, at 246 (with regard to the 
Human Rights Committee).  
 342. See Harris, supra note 214, at 177. Many times the Inter-American System is the only 
space where civil society organizations and governments can debate in safe conditions about 
human rights and where the government is forced to listen and discuss human rights policies. The 
processing of individual cases provides a space where a bilateral discussion occurs between the 
petitioner and the State with the IACHR mediating the discussion between the parties. This 
discussion will eventually provide the IACHR with the information required to adopt a resolution 
if necessary or may permit the resolution of the case through friendly settlement. The 
Commission is thus a platform upon which the struggle over human rights between and among 
activists and States has played out. Engstrom, supra note 333, at 13.  
 343. As Cohen has said, “Many times, States argue that victims, witnesses, journalists and 
human rights organizations are lying and cannot be believed because they have a political interest 
in discrediting the government.  If the source of the evidence can be shown to be suspect in any of 
these ways, then the violations obviously did not take place or are being exaggerated.” Stanley 
Cohen, Government Responses to Human Rights Reports: Claims, Denials, and Counterclaims, 
18 HUM. RTS. Q. 517, 524 (1996). As the Commission studies each complaint with the same 
degree of respect for the petitioners and gives the same degree of weigh to their arguments, the 
process itself serves to give legitimacy to those actors. If the Commission, in addition, rules in 
their favor, their legitimacy and credibility increases enormously.  
 344. I understand that goals and effects are not necessarily the same. I am conflating them in 
this article for the purpose of showing that compliance with the decisions of the Commission is 
too limited to analyze the effectiveness of the Commission and to show that the process is as 
important as the outcome.  
 345. Victor Abramovich, From Massive Violations to Structural Patterns: New Approaches 
and Classic Tensions in the Inter-American Human Rights System, SUR INT’L HUM. RTS. L.J., 7, 
10 (2009). 
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problems that are at the root of the conflict analyzed in the case.346 Thus, 
most of those involved with the Inter-American system agree that a 
crucial goal should be to enhance its domestic impact.347 Supranational 
bodies will generally have the greatest impact when their procedures 
and judgments are relevant to local actors.348 But even in this broader 
sense, the importance of State compliance with the rulings of the 
Commission (and the Court) cannot be denied.349 
The processing of cases by the Commission (and also by the 
Court) has gradually become a privileged arena of civil society 
activism, producing innovative strategies that make use of the 
international repercussion of those cases and situations they denounce. 
Organizations use the IACHR and the processing of cases not only to 
denounce violations and make visible certain questionable State 
practices, but also to attain a measure of legitimacy that allows them to 
dialogue with governments and their partners from a different status, 
and to invert the power relationship, altering the dynamics of domestic 
political processes.350 As such, the processing of cases by the 
Commission (and not necessarily the final decision), even a lengthy one, 
should be viewed as a space that could force, facilitate, and expand 
social participation and legitimize social actors.351  
I agree with Koh that transnational actors obey international law as 
a result of repeated interaction with other actors in the transnational 
legal process.352 Thus, “a first step is to empower more actors to 
participate.”353 Transnational legal processes, including the 
Commission’s case system, trigger those interactions.354 Interactions 
between the Commission, government representatives, and 
organizations strengthen the position of the victims as well.355 The cases 
of the Commission demonstrate that in the international arena, the 
process is as important as the outcome. As a process, the Commission 
 
 346. Id. at 12.  
 347. For the same argument with regard to the Court, see Cavallaro, supra note 261, at 2. 
 348. Id. at 770. 
 349. Huneeus, supra note 1, at 505.  
 350. See Par Engstrom & Andrew Hurrell, Why the Human Rights Regime in the Americas 
matters, THE HUMAN RIGHTS REGIMES IN THE AMERICAS: THEORY AND REALITY 37 (Monica 
Serrano & Vesselin Popovski eds., 2010). 
 351. Abramovich, supra note 345, at 14.  
 352. Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law? 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 
2656 (1997).  
 353. Id. 
 354. Harold Hongju Koh, Jefferson Memorial Lecture Transnational Legal Process After 
September 11th, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 337, 339 (2004). 
 355. Jorge Contesse, Constitucionalismo Interamericano: Algunas Notas Sobre Las 
Dinámicas de Creación e Internalización de Los Derechos Humanos, in   EL DERECHO EN 
AMERICA LATINA: UN MAPA PARA EL PENSAMIENTO JURÍDICO DEL SIGLO XXI 251, 267 (Cesar 
Rodriguez Garavito ed., 2012). 
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provides a forum in which argumentation takes place. It provides a key 
meeting place and arena for the mobilization of consensus and a site for 
the battle of justifications.356 The IACHR contributes, in this sense, to 
shifts in how government actors understand problems and attempt to 
deal or justify them.357 
Additionally, the processing of cases by the Commission 
contributes to what Helfer has named “diffuse embeddedness”358 and 
fulfills part of the socializing functions that international institutions can 
exert over the behavior of national actors.359 That the Commission can 
exert influence over the behavior of national decision-makers does not 
rest on its coercive power, but rather in the “the skillful [sic] use of 
persuasion to realign the interests and incentives of decision-makers in 
favour of compliance” with the Commission’s decisions.360  
Finally, interaction with the System may affect the relative power 
of sectors within the government that deal with human rights issues. 
Operating within the System, and having to justify the State’s official 
policies in terms of the System’s discourse while remaining engaged 
with other actors (particularly domestic human rights groups), fosters 
this socialization process.361 Thus, the authority of the decisions and the 
jurisprudence of the Inter-American System, and particularly of the 
Commission, depends in part on its social legitimacy and on the 
existence of a community of engaged actors who interact but also 
monitor and disseminate the System’s decisions and standards. In the 
processing of cases, the Commission should be aware of the political 
processes of involved States at key moments. The IACHR also needs to 
support and enhance the community of social, political and academic 
actors who consider themselves protagonists in the evolution of the 
Inter-American System and who participate actively in the processing of 
cases and/or in the national implementation of its decisions and 
principles.362  
 
 356. Alejandro Anaya Muñoz, The role of international Regimes in the constitution of State 
behavior and identity: the case of contemporary Mexico, Special Edition, REVUE QUEBECOISE DE 
DROIT INT’L, (Special Edition) 38, 44 (2011). 
 357. See Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and 
International Human Rights, 54 DUKE L.J. 621, 638 (2004).  
 358. Helfer, supra note 22, at 135.  
 359. Goodman & Jinks, supra note 357, at 635−38.  
 360. Helfer, supra note 22, at 135. 
 361. Engstrom & Hurrell, supra note 350, at 39. 
 362. For instance, legislators who may need to draft new or amend existing legislation; 
prosecutors who may need to open or continue criminal investigations; journalists who may 
disseminate the decisions of the IACHR or law professors who analyze, criticize, support and/or 
teach those decisions. 
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From this perspective, the Commission’s processes and the 
decisions it renders are equally important. The Commission should 
develop procedures that increase the relevance of its cases to domestic 
(and in some cases, international) movements that are working to 
eliminate the structural causes of human rights violations. It should 
design a system that facilitates access, legitimization, and dialogue. In 
that sense, the Court has been criticized for certain counterproductive 
measures it has adopted, such as reducing the number of witnesses who 
appear in person at Court hearings or reducing the number of days for 
public hearings in each case.363 While those measures reduced the 
length of the Court’s procedure, the outcome was achieved at the 
expense of space for public advocacy.364 This critique shows the 
connection between process, outcome and implementation. The IACHR 
should be careful in the design and administration of a procedure that is 
perceived as legitimate by all the actors involved. If the Commission 
acts and processes cases in a way that is perceived as illegitimate, the 
possibility of States acting according to the IACHR’s recommendations 
will be lower.365  
The conception of the processing of cases as a space for 
transnational socialization, together with the different goals that the 
Commission pursues in general and in processing individual complaints 
in particular, could give rise to very different and perhaps directly 
contradictory suggestions as to whether and how to speed up the 
adjudicative mechanism.366 From this perspective, it should be 
determined when the processing of cases and petitions requires 
expediency, some degree of delay, or some balance of the two.367 In the 
context of international criminal tribunals, time and delay can be 
essential to successful prosecutions, and expediency in war crimes 
prosecutions is not always possible, or even desirable.368 If societies 
coming out of civil wars are not ready to seek justice in the immediate 
aftermath of such traumatic events, the passing of time may open 
possibilities for the arrest or prosecution of those accused of committing 
 
 363. Cavallaro, supra note 261, at 770. 
 364. Id. at 781, 799. See Helfer, supra note 22, at 136 for a description of how a procedural 
tool such as the pilot judgment serves the purpose of increasing the dialogue between the 
European Court and National Parliaments.  
 365. Cavallaro, supra note 261, at 775; see generally THOMAS FRANCK, THE POWER OF 
LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (Oxford Univ. Press 1990) (arguing that the more legitimate 
international institutions appear to be and function in the eyes of States, the greater is their 
capacity to secure compliance with its decisions). 
 366. Similarly, in the context of international criminal justice, see Galbraith, supra note 26 at 
82.  
 367. See Whiting, supra note 25 at 326 (nothing the similarity in the context of international 
criminal justice). 
 368. Id.  
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international crimes.369 The same reasoning could be applicable to the 
Commission in certain circumstances. The IACHR consistently 
recommends identification, prosecution and punishment of those 
responsible for grave human rights violations.370  
More broadly, the timetable of processing cases does not 
necessarily coincide with political momentum. Therefore, advocates 
need to at least recognize this dissociation between decisions and 
impacts. Advocates need to be able to advocate for their cases only 
when the political moment in the country offer, at least in theory, the 
best chances of effective international pressure by means of a decision 
of the Commission. 371   
Achieving the goal of protecting individuals requires State 
cooperation, participation, and engagement. To facilitate State 
involvement, the Commission may need to provide more time and 
opportunity for States to respond, rather than handling a decision 
without the State buying in. Similarly, a flexible procedure and flexible 
management of the procedure gives States an opportunity to rectify the 
situations that occasioned the complaints. A flexible procedure that 
allows for fluid discussion between the parties enhances the probability 
of compliance with the final decision.372 
As one of the goals of the petition system is to promote dialogue 
between petitioners and the State, the Commission has had to grant 
leeway with deadlines to provide States with sufficient time to answer 
complaints. The individual complaint mechanism could occasionally 
run against the idea of a speedy processing of petitions as the timing of 
a policy discussion and of the processing of a case are not necessarily 
the same. Repetitive briefs, multiple hearings, and working meetings 
may be required even if they delay the final decision.373  
 
 369. Id. 
 370. See, e.g., Manoel Leal de Oliveira, Case 12.308, (recommending the State to “conduct a 
thorough, impartial, and effective investigation into the events, so as to identify and punish all of 
the material and intellectual authors of the murder”). 
371. James L. Cavallaro & Emily J. Schaffer, Less as More: Rethinking Supranational 
Litigation of Economic and Social Rights in the Americas, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 217, 251 (2005).  
 372. Michael Cosgrove, Protecting the Protectors: Preventing the Decline of the Inter-
American System for the Protection of Human Rights, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 39, 48–49 
(2000). 
 373. See for instance the Correa Belisle case that involved a challenge to the Argentine 
Military Code of Justice. The petition was submitted in 1997, the parties reached, after long 
negotiations, an agreement in 2006, but Congress modified the Code only in 2007 and the 
Commission adopted a report in 2010. Rodolfo Luis Correa Belisle, Petition No. 11.758, Inter-
Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 15/10 (Mar. 16, 2010), available at 
http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2010eng/ARSA11758EN.doc. 
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Of course, a dialogue that occurs several years, or even decades, 
after the alleged human rights violation took place could be, in many 
instances, completely irrelevant. In the intervening years and decades, 
the victims, witnesses, and perpetrators may have died. The harm may 
have been exacerbated. Governments and regimes may have changed. 
Given the likelihood of these occurrences, how could the goal to 
promote dialogue be served if the Commission decides a case ten or 
fifteen years after the violation happened?374 
Like any organization, the Commission may be effective in 
fulfilling all or most of its goals but still be inefficient by generating 
considerable costs and negative externalities.375 Similarly, the 
Commission may be efficient in acting expeditiously but ineffective if it 
fails to meet its goals.376 Thus, the delays and backlog of the 
Commission should be understood in light of the different 
Commission’s goals. The design and administration of a speedy 
adjudicatory process should be at the service of the goals that the 
Commission pursues, and the solutions sought should serve to enhance 
the ability of the Commission to achieve those goals. Any discussion on 
restructuring the proceedings should consider the impact of the different 
measures on those goals.377  
As a consequence, the range of possible solutions that the 
Commission could implement is limited.378 For instance, the goal of 
protecting victims and legitimizing actors in the handling of individual 
complaints requires open access to as many individuals as possible, 
particularly those marginalized and harassed.379 A move to a more 
automated and web-based system could not be fully adopted if it 
imperils the right of access to the Commission by individuals without 
access to computers or the Internet, as is the case in many areas in the 
region.380 Also, measures intended to reduce the backlog by raising the 
admissibility bar, making it more difficult to file complaints with the 
 
 374. See Antonio Ferreira Braga, Brazil, Admissibility and Merits, Case 12.019, Inter-Am. 
Comm’n H.R., Report No. 35/08 (2008). In this case, the Commission dealt with the torture by 
the Police against Mr. Ferreira Braga that took place in 1993. The Commission decided the case 
15 years after the torture took place. Surely, by that time, the Governor of the State was not the 
same, the police Chief may have retired, the police officers probably moved up through the ranks, 
Mr. Ferreira did not get any redress and, more concerning, many other people probably suffered 
the same types of torture. 
 375. Shany, supra note 321, at 237.  
 376. Id. at 237.  
 377. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 65. 
 378. Id. 
 379. Id. 
 380. Id. 
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IACHR, or creating a certiorari type of filter,381 would run against those 
goals of the Commission.382 
The process itself, rather than its outcome, is an essential 
component of the functioning and effectiveness of the Commission. Just 
initiating a case can serve important short-term goals, such as bringing 
attention to an underlying problem, issue, or violation; beginning to 
identify and stigmatize those violations and the State responsibility for 
them; focusing the international community attention; and validating the 
suffering of the victims.383 For purposes such as serving as an early 
warning, the opening of a case, and the holding of a hearing, the issuing 
of a press release rather than the final disposition of the case could help 
raise awareness about the particular issue, victim or violation384. 
As a space for dialogue and for human rights advocacy, the 
processing of cases itself, rather than the outcome, is essential. Thus, in 
certain circumstances, the speedy resolution of cases could hamper this 
space. For instance, if those responsible for an alleged violation still 
hold power, State cooperation and willingness to discuss human rights 
issues may not be forthcoming until those officials are out of power. A 
long, drawn out process that keeps a case open could encourage 
international condemnation, pressure the government officials involved 
to leave office, and facilitate future cooperation with new 
governments.385 
Alternatively, a slow, selective, and frustrating process also 
hampers the credibility and legitimacy of the Commission. Years of 
inactivity, repetitive steps, and uncertainty lead to frustration and 
disengagement from States and NGOs alike. While a flexible and time-
consuming process helps the Commission in certain circumstances to 
 
 381. See Cesar Gaviria, Secretariat for Legal Affairs, Organization of American States, 
Document Presented at the General Assembly Session: Toward a New Vision of the Inter-
American Human Rights System (Nov. 3, 1997) (available at CP/doc.2828/96). 
 382. Ariel Dulitzky, Viviana Krsticevic and Alejandro Valencia Villa, “Una Visión No-
Gubernamental del Proceso de Reforma del Sistema Interamericano de Derechos Humanos,” 4 
THE JOURNAL OF LATIN AMERICAN AFFAIRS 38, 41 (1996), available at 
http://www.utexas.edu/law/faculty/adulitzky/43-Non-Govt-Perspective-esp.pdf . 
 383. Whiting, supra note 25, at 328. 
 384. For example, the press release and its annex issued by the Commission at the end of its 
143rd. Session where the Commission highlights the situation of women, indigenous peoples and 
children among others based on the information received during hearings. Press Release, Inter-
Am. Comm’n H.R., IACHR Brings its 143rd Regular Session to a Close (Nov. 4, 2011), 
available at http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/media_center/PReleases/2011/117.asp.  
 385. For instance, after the reestablishment of the democratic government in Peru in 2000, the 
new Government offered “solutions to a significant number of cases” that were pending with the 
IACHR. See Joint Press Release, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Meeting with Representatives of the 
Government of Peru (Feb. 22, 2001) available at 
http://www.cidh.org/Comunicados/English/2001/Peru.htm. 
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promote some of its goals, there is a point where the lethargic pace of 
adjudication impacts the overall effectiveness of the IACHR. Delays 
diminish the deterrent value of processing cases, undermine the quality 
of evidence, allow the perpetrators to continue living in impunity, 
discourage and marginalize victims, and lead to a squandering of the 
international community’s interest in such cases.386   
In sum, the Commission has multiple goals in the promotion and 
protection of human rights. These goals sometimes contradict each 
other. The Commission must strike the appropriate balance between the 
speedy resolution of human rights claims and making sure that States 
redress victims. In doing so, it may sometimes have to sacrifice the goal 
of a speedy process in order to achieve other goals. The architecture of 
its case system needs to reflect those tensions and be flexible enough to 
accommodate them. Finally, the process is as relevant as its outcome 
represented by the final decision of the Commission. In the next section, 
I make recommendations to the Commission with those tensions in 
mind.  
VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION 
Based on our study and experience, and considering our vision of 
the Commission’s goals, there are several recommendations to make. 
Most of the changes outlined here require only modifications in 
practices or in the Rules of Procedure. Thus, most of the 
recommendations (with the exception of the financial resources) are 
under the control of the Commission and could be implemented by the 
Commission itself. I purposely avoided making any recommendations 
that would require amending the Convention or the Statute which 
involve State participation and consent.387 Nevertheless, in several 
publications, I have advocated for a more radical change that would 
amend the American Convention to clearly establish a division of duties 
between the Commission and Court in processing individual 
complaints.388 In that sense, this section should be read as only one 
 
 386. Whiting, supra note 25, at 326. In fact, one may wonder how the years of delay end up 
shaping the Inter-American docket. It seems that the only actors who would be interested in using 
such a system are well-established civil society players who have long-term strategies. 
Individuals and NGOs who have a shorter time horizons will avoid the Inter-American system, or 
pursue only precautionary measures, or delegate the whole litigation process to those more 
established NGOs. As such, delays contribute to the type of actors who actively interact with the 
Commission and the type of strategies that they pursue. I thank Alex Huneeus for this 
observation.  
 387. American Convention, supra note 7, art. 76; Commission Statute, supra note 50, art. 22. 
 388. I propose a fundamental change in the IACHR’s profile through the modification of its 
participation in the individual petition system. The Commission should only act as an organ of  
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component of a multi-dimensional, long-term reform of the Inter-
American System. Finally most of the recommendations do not require 
additional funds. 
The OAS is the main party responsible for the current situation as 
the Commission is underfunded and understaffed.389 The OAS should 
allocate more resources to help the Commission reverse the increasing 
backlogs and delays. I believe that 25% of the OAS budget should be 
allocated to the Commission and the Court.390 As long as member states 
do not properly fund the Commission, they will continue to be the main 
parties responsible for the current backlog and delay. Providing the 
necessary funds avoids conflicts of interest for donating member and 
observer states, and is, simultaneously, more sustainable in the long 
run.391 The Commission has launched fundraising campaigns that 
involve targeted goals aimed at specific functions of the Commission.392 
The Commission’s approach to fundraising should continue to focus on 
the publicized goals including the reduction of its backlog. Some 
observers have said that if no additional funds are provided, the 
Commission faces a potential collapse.393  
While an increase in funding and human resources would enable 
the Commission to address more petitions and cases in a timely manner, 
it is not the solution to all of the challenges faced by the Commission. 
The IACHR may make several changes that do not require additional 
funding. Those changes would enable the Commission to reallocate its 
existing resources more efficiently, and consequently, would increase its 
overall effectiveness.  
 
admissibility and facilitator of friendly solutions, and the Court as a tribunal that carries out 
findings of fact and makes legal determinations on the merits of complaints. See, e.g., Dulitzky, 
Fifty Years, supra note 1, at 128; Ariel Dulitzky, La OEA y los Derechos Humanos: nuevos 
perfiles para el Sistema Interamericano, 4 DIÁLOGO POLÍTICO 69–108 (Konrad-Adenauer 
Stiftung, 2008); Ariel Dulitzky, Reflexiones sobre la judicialización interamericana y propuesta 
de nuevos perfiles para el amparo interamericano, LA REFORMA DEL PROCESO DE AMPARO: LA 
EXPERIENCIA COMPARADA, 327 (Samuel B. Abad Yuparqui & Pablo Pérez Tremps eds., 
Palestra, 2009) [hereinafter Dulitzky, Reflexiones]. 
 389. See supra Section VI.  
 390. See Dulitzky, Reflexiones, supra note 388.  
 391. See Cavallaro, supra note 261, at 783. 
 392. Budget of the Strategic Plan, supra note 7, at i. 
 393. Maria Claudia Pulido, Los Desafíos Presupuestarios y Financieros de la Comisión 
Interamericana de Derechos Humanos de la OEA,16 DUE PROCESS OF LAW FOUNDATION, 59, 61 
(2012). 
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A.  Structure of the Proceedings 
1.  Combined Commission Decision 
The Commission should amend its Rules and combine the 
admissibility and merits decisions into one.394 Our data suggests that the 
separation of the admissibility and merits decisions did not bring more 
clarity to admissibility requirements and actually slowed, rather than 
quickened, the pace of adjudication.395 The implementation of this 
recommendation, above all others, would notably reduce the backlog 
and delay.396 The experience of the Court, combining its preliminary 
objections, merits and reparations stages, suggest that this change will 
be effective in speeding up the process and reducing backlog and 
duplication.397 Many States and other actors may object to this 
change.398 In fact, the OAS recommended exactly the opposite, asking 
the Commission to define objective criteria for the combining of the 
admissibility and merits stages.399 However, the Commission’s 
credibility and legitimacy has been developed—and continues to be 
built—on its determination to create a system responsive to the needs of 
 
 394. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 101.  
 395. Id. 
 396. Id. 
 397. Id. 
 398. See OAS Results, supra note 303, at 10 (indicating that in practice deferring the 
treatment of admissibility until consideration of the merits “substantially affects due process” and 
“restricts the process of seeking a friendly settlement”).  
 399. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 101. The Commission did so in its recent 
reforms to its Rules. Revised Article 36. 3 states:  
In exceptional circumstances, and after having requested information from 
the parties in accordance with the provisions of Article 30 of these Rules of 
Procedure, the Commission may open a case but defer its treatment of 
admissibility until the debate and decision on the merits. The decision shall 
be adopted by a reasoned resolution of the Commission, which will include 
an analysis of those exceptional circumstances. The exceptional 
circumstances that the Commission shall take into account will include the 
following:  
a. when the consideration of the applicability of a possible 
exception to the requirement of exhaustion of domestic 
remedies would be inextricably tied to the merits of the matter;  
b. in cases of seriousness and urgency, or when the Commission 
considers that the life or personal integrity of a person may be 
in imminent danger; or  
c. when the passage of time may prevent the useful effect of the 
decision by the Commission.  
Draft Reform of Rules, supra note 298, art.36.3.  
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the victims.400 One of the main demands of the victims is to have their 
complaints fully decided in a timely manner.401 
2.  Addressing Structural Issues 
The Commission should consider using pilot decisions similar to 
the pilot judgments of the European Court of Human Rights.402 Pilot 
decisions would be applicable to cases that are virtually the same with 
respect to the structural problems underlying them.403 This method will 
be most effective if the Commission implements a procedure so that 
once a decision is made, all pending cases involving the same issue are 
noted and immediately resolved using the per curiam decision.404 The 
modifications to the Rules would create a procedure that operates when 
the Commission receives a significant number of petitions deriving 
from the same root cause.405 In those situations, the Commission may 
decide to select one or more of them for priority treatment. In dealing 
with the selected petition/case or petitions/cases, it will seek to achieve 
a solution that extends beyond the particular petition/case so as to cover 
all similar cases.406 While Article 29.1.d of the Rules allows for joining 
petitions that are in the same stage, it does not allow the Commission to 
deal with petitions and cases at different stages.407 It also does not 
 
 400.  MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 101. 
 401.  Id. 
 402.  Id. at 103. 
 403.  In Europe, once the systematic nature of a case is identified, all other cases dealing with 
the same issue are put on hold. See THE RIGHT HONORABLE LORD WOOLF ET AL., REVIEW OF 
THE WORKING METHODS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 39 (2005), available at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/2005_Lord_Woolf_working_methods_ENG.pdf. That one 
case is litigated, and the subsequent decision, the “pilot judgment,” aims for the State in question 
to address the systematic problem at the national level for all those concerned. Thus, all 
subsequent cases are encapsulated within the “pilot judgment.” Id. The first European Court pilot-
judgment procedure—concerning the so-called Bug River cases from Poland (Broniowski v. 
Poland (No. 31443/96), 2004-V Eur. Ct. H.R. and Broniowski v. Poland (Friendly Settlement), 
2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R.) was taken to a successful conclusion since new legislation was introduced 
and the pending cases were settled. See, e.g., Kachel v. Poland (No. 22930/05), 2008-IV Eur. Ct. 
H.R. See also E.G. v. Poland and 175 Other Bug River Applications (No. 50425/99), 1008-IV 
Eur. Ct. H.R., http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-
88774#{"itemid":["001-88774"]}. See also Comm. of Ministers (EC), Res(2004)3 of  12 May 
2004 (on judgments revealing an underlying systemic problem). The pilot judgments have saved 
the European Court an enormous amount of time and labor and had helped to publicize its 
determination to find comprehensive solutions to systemic human rights problems. Helfer, supra 
note 22, at 148. 
 404. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 103. 
 405. Id. at 104. 
 406. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 103−04. For a similar proposal see Ramos, 
supra note 24, at 175. 
 407. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 104. 
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provide for a clear mechanism establishing the effect of one decision on 
cases and petitions dealing with the same pattern of conduct.408 
The Commission may also want to consider the option of 
“adjourning or ‘freezing’ the examination of all other related cases for a 
period of time.”409 If the Commission adopts this model, it must set 
certain conditions. First, it should limit the “freeze” to a set period of 
time or end the “freeze” if the State fails to show good faith efforts.410 
Second, it needs to confirm that the cases selected are truly legally and 
factually representative of the group and underlying systemic 
problems.411 Third, it should require the State to act promptly on the 
recommendations in the pilot decision.412  Fourth, it should continually 
keep petitioners in all cases informed about the ongoing procedure.413 
Fifth, the Commission needs to include in its recommendations or 
mandate that the potential friendly settlement ensures solutions to all 
similarly-situated victims and is appropriate to remedy the systemic 
human rights issues it has adjudicated.414 The Commission should 
emphasize that it may resume examination of “frozen” cases at any time 
if the State fails to comply with the structural recommendations.415 Pilot 
decisions function only if States comply with the decisions rendered in 
the pilot case. As the level of compliance with the Commission’s 
decisions is quite low, the utility of pilot decisions should be carefully 
analyzed. The Commission should include these pertinent provisions in 
its Rules. The use of pilot decisions should not be mandatory and 
 
 408. Id. 
 409.  EUR. CT. H.R., THE PILOT-JUDGMENT PROCEDURE: INFORMATION NOTE ISSUED BY THE 
REGISTRAR 5 (2009), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/DF4E8456-77B3-4E67-
8944-B908143A7E2C/0/Information_Note_on_the_PJP_for_Website.pdf. 
 410. See id. 
 411. See id. at 1. 
 412. See id. 
 413. See id. 
 414. See Helfer supra note 22, at 154.  
 415. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 104. This appears to be the situation with the 
case of the dozens of petitions related to the process of confirmation of judges and prosecutors 
made by the Consejo Nacional de la Magistratura [National Judicial Council] (CNM) in Peru. 
The Commission had “called upon the State to find a comprehensive solution to the problem of 
judges not reconfirmed by the National Council of the Magistracy, and to request the State to 
submit to the Commission, within a period of one month counted from the date of notification of 
the instant report, a proposed comprehensive solution to the situation of all the prosecutors and 
magistrates who were not reconfirmed.” See Romeo Edgardo Vargas Romero, Petition No. 494-
04, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 20/08 (2008), available at 
http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2008eng/Peru494.04eng.htm. The absence of a pilot judgment 
mechanism, the Commission’s reluctance to proceed with the accumulation of all the petitions, 
the reticent attitude of some petitioners, and Peru’s lack of implementation of an integral remedy 
forced the Commission to spend time adopting at least six friendly settlement reports. See Reports 
Nos. 107/05, 50/06, 109/06, 20/07, 20/08 and 22/11, available at 
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/decisions/friendly.asp, 
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instead, should provide the Commission enough flexibility to decide 
when it is pertinent to apply that procedure and when the use of pilot 
decisions should not lead to an adjournment of cases. In order to create 
an incentive for the State to resolve the problem, the Rules need to 
establish a fast-track procedure for those “unfrozen” cases and provide a 
stronger presumption that all these “unfrozen” cases will be filed with 
the Court immediately (given that the State accepts the jurisdiction of 
the Tribunal).416 
3.  Petitions Intake System 
The Commission should reform the way it receives and registers 
petitions.417 Specifically, the Commission should take steps to increase 
the number of petitions submitted online and reduce the number of 
unacceptable petitions.418 The online form should preclude the 
possibility of filing incomplete petitions. The Commission should also 
publish the Rules within the online petition system, with an explanatory 
note drafted in a more user-friendly manner, showing examples of 
petitions that are clearly unacceptable.419 By being very explicit with 
these standards and examples, and transmitting them in a very 
simplified and user-friendly manner, the number of unacceptable 
petitions will be reduced and the transparency of the Commission’s 
standards increased.420  
4.  Continued Use of Archiving Decisions 
The Commission should continue using archival decisions to 
eliminate inactive petitions and cases from its docket.421 Nevertheless, 
archival decisions “should not depend automatically on procedural 
inactivity with respect to a petition, given that such a situation might 
 
 416. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 104.  
 417. Id. at 100. 
 418. Id. 
 419. Id. See also, OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, STRENGTHENING THE 
UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY BODY SYSTEM DUBLIN II MEETING OUTCOME 
DOCUMENT, 86  (2011) [hereinafter Dublin II]. Treaty bodies should give increased visibility to 
individual communications procedures, including the admissibility requirements, to facilitate their 
more effective use by individuals. Id. at 101 (The Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights should develop and disseminate enhanced guidelines on submission of individual 
communications in order to assist towards the improvement of quality of submissions and reduce 
the number of inadmissible or manifestly ill-founded cases submitted to treaty bodies.).  
 420. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 100.  
 421. See OAS Results, supra note 303, at 11.  
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arise because of delay by the Commission in processing the petition or 
for other reasons that have nothing to do with inaction on the part of the 
petitioner.”422 The IACHR needs to keep in mind that a number of 
inactive cases are not necessarily inactive owing to absence of action on 
the part of the petitioner, but rather a delay on the part of the 
Commission. The delay should not operate automatically to the 
detriment of the victim or petitioner. As many petitioners or victims 
relocate for purposes of personal safety or due to worsening economics, 
the IACHR should proceed only when effective notice has been given to 
the petitioner, or when all reasonable steps have been taken to locate the 
petitioner. Also, as archiving is contingent on the filing of additional 
information, and as many victims and petitioners belong to communities 
traditionally excluded from legal protections, or which do not have the 
resources to do the documentation work requested by the Commission, 
the response time allotted should be appropriate.423 
5.  Friendly Settlement 
The Commission should continue to make friendly settlement a 
high priority in its mission. The recently created specialized Friendly 
Settlement Group is an important first step. The Friendly Settlement 
Group should identify cases that are more likely to settle and encourage 
States and petitioners to attend mediation sessions and find a resolution 
to the situation.424  
The Rules of Procedure allow the Commission to make itself 
available to parties at any point during the processing of a case.425 The 
Friendly Settlement Group should take advantage of this prerogative at 
the beginning stages of the processing of a petition, such as after the 
initial review when the Commission first requests observations from the 
State.426 
Friendly settlement can also be a tool that addresses structural 
problems or recurring issues. The Commission should encourage 
friendly settlement to dispose of groups of similar cases.427 If a 
petitioner refuses to agree to a settlement that all other petitioners in the 
group agree on, publishing a report and not referring the case to the 
Court could be a remedy to those who did not settle.428 The Commission 
 
 422. Coalition Observations, supra note 338, at 11.  
 423. CEJIL Observations, supra note 137, at 11−12.  
 424. See MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 105−06. 
 425. See Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 51, art. 40.1. 
 426. See MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 106. 
 427. Id. 
 428. Id. 
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may need to have a presumption that where there are holdouts to group 
settlements—i.e. one or two petitioners do not agree to the settlement, 
but a large number of petitioners do agree—the unsettled petitions will 
not be referred to the Court.429 The Commission would have to decide 
what ratio of holdouts to petitioners in agreement is necessary for such a 
presumption when writing the rule. Further, the rule would only involve 
a presumption that the case should not be referred to the Court. That 
way, if the petitioner had a strong reason for not agreeing to the 
settlement, the Commission could still consider the option to ignore the 
presumption and refer the case to the Court.430 The experience of class 
action settlements and the regulations related to objectors in the United 
States could provide guidance in this area.431 
It is crucial that new rules specify the effects of noncompliance 
with friendly settlement.432 Currently, once the Commission adopts a 
report approving a friendly settlement, there is no possibility to continue 
with the petition or case even if the State does not comply with the 
agreement. This situation may cause petitioners to refuse to sign 
agreements because of the possibility of State noncompliance.433 The 
Rules need to provide for the re-opening of a case after a prudential 
amount of time has elapsed and if no substantial compliance exists.434  
The IACHR should conduct more working visits to States and 
should emphasize friendly settlement in those visits. Commissioners can 
hold or facilitate mediation sessions during the working visits to resolve 
issues between petitioners and the State.435  
 
 429. Id. 
 430. Id. 
 431. Id. 
 432. HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC, UNIV. OF TEXAS SCH. OF LAW, MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, 
MINIMIZING DELAY: STREAMLINING PROCEDURES OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS 106 (2011), 
http://www.utexas.edu/law/clinics/humanrights/work/Maximizing_Justice_Minimizing_Delay_at
_the_IACHR.pdf  
 433. Id. 
 434. Id. The Commission may look at Article 37, Section 2 of the European Convention that 
allows the European Court to restore an application to its list of cases if it considers that the 
circumstances justify such a course. See, e.g., Katić v. Serbia, App. No. 13920/04, 2010-II Eur. 
Ct. H.R. 1 (2010) (reinstating a case after failure to comply with the terms of a friendly settlement 
agreement). 
 435. Id. This proposal may require additional funds. 
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6.  Follow-up Measures 
Article 48.1 of the Rules should be amended to make the adoption 
of follow-up measures mandatory and not discretionary.436 The 
Commission should follow-up actively and more closely on cases by 
making detailed assessments on the status of each recommendation. In 
order to facilitate implementation and secure proper follow-up, the 
Commission should avoid vague language that merely indicates that 
States should “adopt necessary measures.”437 The Commission should 
specify as much as possible what sorts of measures would be 
sufficient.438 Additionally, the IACHR should create, and make public, 
clear criteria to evaluate whether, and to what degree, a 
recommendation has been complied with. In its review of the status of 
compliance with its decisions, the Commission should provide clearer 
information explaining what constitutes full and partial compliance.439  
There is a clear correlation between full implementation of the 
decisions and reduction of the backlog. If States follow the 
Commission’s recommendations in individual cases, there will be a 
positive impact in similar cases. First, future violations could be 
prevented.440 And for similar violations that already took place, those 
similar cases could be solved by friendly settlements, shorter reports; 
even withdrawal from the case docket of the Commission or avoidance 
of its filing altogether.  
Working visits are particularly appropriate to conduct follow-up 
measures. Thus, the Commission should conduct more targeted country 
visits. The agenda of these visits should include meetings with 
petitioners and the Government to discuss the measures taken to comply 
with the Commission’s and Court’s decisions, and with State officers 
with decision-making power and responsibility to implement key 
recommendations and decisions. Before these visits, the Commission 
should issue a public statement indicating the status of each case to be 
 
 436. Id. at 107. 
 437. See, e.g., Basch, supra note 137, at 32.  
 438. See OAS Results, supra note 303, at 13. See also Dublin II, supra note 419, at ¶ 93 
(discussing the UN treaty body system). “Remedies should, to the greatest extent possible, be 
framed in a way that allows their implementation to be measured. Treaty bodies should use 
targeted and focused remedial language and, where possible, be prescriptive . . . Proposed 
remedies should be structured around short- and long-term goals, specifying concrete steps to be 
taken by States.” Id.  
 439. The same recommendation has been put forth regarding the Court’s decisions. See 
Basch, supra note 137, at 32.  
 440. In fact, the Commission routinely recommends States to “adopt all necessary measures 
to prevent the recurrence of similar acts, in accordance with the responsibility to prevent and to 
guarantee the fundamental rights recognized in the American Convention.” See Martín Pelicó 
Coxic, Case 11.658, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 80/07 (2007). 
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discussed with the parties. At the end of the visit, the IACHR should 
issue another press statement indicating the commitments assumed by 
the States to implement the recommendations, if any.441 
During each visit, the Commission should bring to the attention of 
the authorities not only those cases with merits decisions, friendly 
settlement or court judgments, but also other similar pending cases to 
address structural problems.  
B.  Management of the Procedure 
1.  Reduction of Duplication  
The Commission has taken steps to eliminate duplicative steps in 
its process. These are small changes, but over the course of a day or a 
week, they add up. The less time spent on duplicative matters, the more 
time the Commission can spend on processing cases. For instance, only 
recently are States no longer notified by duplicate methods. It was not 
until mid-2011 that the IACHR started to notify States by just one 
method—since mid-2011, petitioners are notified by email or other 
methods only in the absence of email.442 
2.  New simplified format for admissibility reports 
If the Commission does not adopt our recommendation to unify the 
admissibility and merits stages, the admissibility reports should be 
adopted in a simplified manner.443 The only topic that the Commission 
needs to address in each report is the one that the State contests in an 
explicit manner. If the State does not challenge any admissibility issue, 
the Commission should defer its treatment to the merits stage.444  
 
 441. See MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 108. Again, these additional visits may 
require additional funds.  
 442. Id. at 100. 
 443. See Ramos, supra note 24, at 173 (proposing that “the admissibility approach should be 
more concise, like that of the European’s human rights system and operate as a checklist, rather 
than a long description and legal analysis of the facts”).  
 444. The European Court also uses simplified summary decisions on established matters of 
law. The new Article 28(1)(b) of the European Convention empowers judges to rule, in a 
simplified summary procedure, not only on the admissibility, but also on the merits of an 
application, if the underlying question “is already the subject of well-established case-law of the 
Court.” European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as 
amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, June 1, 2010, C.E.T.S. 194, art. 28(1)(b).  “This applies, in 
particular, to cases where an application is one of a series deriving from the same systemic defect 
at the national level; hence, a repetitive case.” Patricia Egli, Protocol No. 14 To The European 
Convention For The Protection Of Human Rights And Fundamental Freedoms: Towards A More  
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3.  Adoption of Admissibility Decisions and Preliminary Revision  
of Merits Reports by a Working Group  
If the Commission does not implement the recommendation to 
combine the admissibility and merits decisions, or even until such 
change comes into force, it should adopt admissibility reports through a 
working group composed of four members445 rather than by the plenary 
of the Commission. The plenary should, instead, focus on discussing 
merits decisions.446 The admissibility decisions could be adopted during 
the sessions or virtually when the Commission is not in session, leaving 
even more time for merits decisions during sessions.447 The other three 
Commissioners not participating in the admissibility discussion should 
form another working group to do an initial review of the merits reports 
in order to speed up their discussion in plenary. These changes would 
shift the Commission’s attention during session to merits decisions.448  
4. Commission’s Use of Per Curiam Decisions 
The Commission has used the per curiam tool in cases such as 
Fierro449 and Thomas.450 “Recently, the Commission made an explicit 
reference to ‘the practice of adopting per curiam decisions’ and 
declared two petitions inadmissible just in one paragraph, by referring 
to a previously decided petition.”451 The Commission should continue 
its practice of using simplified per curiam decisions.452 
 
Effective Control Mechanism?, 17 FLA. ST. J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 13 (2007). 
 445. According to Article 17 of the Statute of the Commission, an absolute majority, four 
members, constitutes quorum. Commission Statute, supra note 50.  
 446. Id. 
 447. Id. 
 448. Id. at 102. See African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights Resolution 
Establishing a Working Group on Communications and Appointment of Members 
ACHPR/Res.194 (L), available at http://www.achpr.org/sessions/50th/resolutions/194/ 
(establishing a Working Group on Communications to meet twice a year during the intersession, 
and which may also meet prior to the Sessions of the African Commission). 
 449. César Fierro v. U.S., Case 11.331, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 99/03 
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.118, doc. 5 rev. 2 ¶ 37 (2003) (the Commission recalled a previous decision and 
decided to “adopt . . . for the purposes of this report its findings in the [previous case] and . . . 
analyze Mr. Fierro’s circumstances in light of those findings”). 
 450. Douglas Christopher Thomas v. U.S., Case 12.240, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 
100/03, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.118, doc. 5 rev.2 ¶¶ 39−41 (2003). 
 451. Soc. Sec. Contributions of Retired and Civil Servants - Physicians Union of the Fed. 
Dist. v. Brazil, Petition 989-04, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 133/09 ¶ 21 (2009) 
available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2009eng/Brazil989.04eng.htm. See also, Social 
Security Contributions of Retired and Pensioned Civil Servants - UNAFISCO, CONAMP, et al.  
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The Rules should be amended to explicitly allow the Commission 
to issue per curiam decisions in cases that are substantially similar to 
cases that have previously been decided. Per curiam decisions would 
point to the past cases and merely declare that the facts and legal issues 
are the same, so that the petition or case is decided in the same manner 
as the previous decision. The Commission should articulate criteria on 
which per curiam decisions can be based and should make those criteria 
and the process of identifying similar cases fully transparent.453  
5.  Receipt of Information and Documents 
The Rules should be revised to require the parties to present their 
evidence and documents at the earlier stages of the process. The 
Commission should follow the Court’s Rules of Procedure that require 
the parties to submit all offered evidence in their initial submissions.454 
Article 57 of the Court Rules provide only very limited exceptions−for 
example, only when the evidence was omitted “due to force majeure or 
serious impediment” or it “refers to an event which occurred after the 
procedural moments indicated.”455  
Such a rule would encourage the parties to present all of their 
evidence early in the process, and allow the Commission to begin 
deliberations sooner, as well as allow both parties to see the strengths 
and weaknesses of their petitions and cases and to determine the 
desirability of a friendly settlement. This change can be implemented 
without sacrificing the fact-finding ability of the Commission and 
cooperation by States and petitioners if the rule is transparent and 
emphasized to the parties ahead of time. Of course, in order to be 
effective, a strict deadline for the receipt of evidence and information 
needs to be accompanied by a speeding up of the rest of the process. 
6.  Consistent Application of the Rules to Speed Up the Process  
The Commission should be much more proactive in applying the 
procedural tools at its disposal to reduce the length of its procedure.456 
The Commission should more frequently apply all the Rules that allow 
 
v. Brazil, Petitions 1133/04 and 115-05, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 134/09 ¶ 23 (2009) 
available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2009eng/Brazil1133.04eng.htm. 
 452. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 103. 
 453. Id. 
 454. Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 51, arts. 35.1, 36.1, 40.2, 41.1. 
 455. Id. art. 57. 
 456. Id. at 101. 
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it to speed up the process, particularly Article 36.4 that allows the 
Commission to join the admissibility and merits decisions in 
exceptional circumstances. Article 36.4 has enormous potential to help 
the Commission to reduce its backlog and speed up the process.457 So 
far, the Commission has applied the rule inconsistently, and mainly in 
death penalty cases.458 In the past, the Commission used to apply Article 
36.4 in all petitions opened before the 2000 amendments, and which had 
been in the Commission for at least five years.459 Furthermore, the 
IACHR joined admissibility and merits decisions when the State did not 
respond to a petition. Apparently, these practices have been abandoned 
in recent years. When declining to use a procedural resource like the 
rule in Article 36.4, the Commission should state clearly why it chose to 
forego this time saving route.  
Additionally the Commission should be much more explicit in 
explaining the different uses of procedural rules for similar cases or 
petitions. The 2013 revisions of the Rules make explicit criteria for 
joining the admissibility and merits stages. The IACHR should 
explicitly expand the justifications for joining the admissibility and 
merits phases to include reasons such as the length of time a petition is 
in the Commission’s docket, and the situation of the victim or 
procedural economy.460  
Article 29.d should also be more consistently used in order to 
accumulate petitions when two or more complaints address similar 
facts, involve the same persons, or reveal the same pattern of conduct.461 
So far, the possibility of accumulating petitions has not been 
systematically applied by the Commission.462 The IACHR needs to 
continuously revise its docket in order to determine the potential 
application of this article as soon as possible.  
If the Convention, the Statute or the Rules establishes specific 
deadlines for the Commission to take certain action, the IACHR should 
be very careful when the Commission does not follow those time 
stipulations.463 If the Commission does not comply with those deadlines, 
explicit, clear and careful explanations should be made publicly.  
 
 457. Coalition Observations, supra note 338, at 11 (underscoring “the importance that this 
mechanism may have for expediting the proceedings by making processing by the IACHR more 
efficient, without jeopardizing the right to defense and procedural due process”). 
 458. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 101. 
 459. CEJIL Observations, supra note 137, at 9. 
 460. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 101. 
 461. Id. 
 462. Id. 
 463. E.g., American Convention, supra note 7, art. 51 (establishing that the Commission 
needs to refer the case to the Court within three months from the approval of the preliminary 
report); Commission Statute, supra note 50, art. 23.2 (requiring the Commission to adopt a merits  
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Finally, while preserving the necessary flexibility of its procedure, 
the Commission needs to be stricter in the application of its deadlines 
and in granting extensions. Articles 30.4 and 37.2 require that any 
request for extensions to be “duly founded.”464 The Secretariat should 
make clear assessment of the reasons for granting extensions. As Article 
30.4 refers only to requests for extensions made by the States, the 
Commission needs to amend its Rules and practices to extend the 
requirement of duly founded requests to include those formulated by 
petitioners. In its reports the Commission needs to include the reasons 
for granting such extensions. The Rules should be amended to clarify 
the consequences of missing deadlines to the parties. Beyond the 
instances expressly mandated in the Rules of Procedure, the IACHR 
should reduce its requests to the parties for observations to an absolute 
minimum.465  
7.  Transparency and data 
In the last fifteen years, the IACHR has adopted several initiatives 
that provide more information on its work and clear criteria for the type 
of decisions that it adopts.466 Nevertheless, greater transparency is 
required for a more effective and efficient Commission in dealing with 
its backlog and delays. For example, the Clinic asked the Commission 
how many cases were awaiting Articles 50 and 51 reports. The 
Commission’s response was simply to say that the “Commission does 
not currently gather the statistics requested.”467  
The Commission can increase support from all the involved actors 
if it publicizes more information. Examples of useful information 
includes information on the way it handles cases and petitions, their 
status, and when the Commission disposes them. The IACHR has 
consistently insisted that States should produce more data on a variety 
of issues. The IACHR considers “data systems [to be] essential in order to 
be able to analyze possible causes and trends and to evaluate the 
 
report within 180 days if a friendly settlement fails).  
 464. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 102. 
 465. Id. 
 466. For instance, the Commission started to publish information on the precautionary 
measures that it adopted in 1997 and on the statistics on the case system in 1998. See Inter-Am. 
Comm’n H.R., IACHR Annual Report 1997, OEA/Ser.L/V/III.39 doc.5, at ch. III.2.A, available 
at http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/97eng/chap.3.htm#_ftn4; Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., IACHR 
Annual Report 1999, OEA/Ser.L/V/III.47 doc.6, at ch. III.B, available at 
http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/99eng/Chapter3.htm#2. 
 467. Commission’s Answers, supra 58, at 16. 
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response[s].”468 I believe that those same conclusions and recommendations 
are applicable to the Commission’s own information on the processing of 
petitions and cases. Making more information available to the public will 
increase both support and public accountability. 
The Commission could learn from the United States Citizenship 
and Immigration Service (USCIS) website and the sheer amount of 
information available to the public on it.469 The IACHR could publish 
more statistical information such as a backlog tracker, the type of claim 
of each petition and case, the timeline of the cases and petitions, the 
status of cases and petitions divided by country and stage of the 
procedure, number of cases and petitions in friendly settlement 
 
 468. OAS, INTER-AMERICAN COMM’N H.R., ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR WOMEN VICTIMS OF 
VIOLENCE IN THE AMERICAS, OAS/Ser.L/V/II, doc. 68 rev. ¶ 181 (2007).  The IACHR also 
recommended States to: 
[c]reate and improve systems for recording statistical and qualitative data[;]  
. . . 
[s]trengthen data records on cases . . . to ensure that they are uniform, reliable 
and transparent[;]  
. . .   
[i]mplement measures so that the data systems more adequately reflect the 
situation[;] . . . [t]ake measures so that data systems are able to disaggregate 
the data by sex, age, race, ethnic origin, and other variables[;] . . . [k]eep 
reliable, up-to-date statistics[;]  
. . .  
[i]nstitutionalize means and methods to share information within a diversity 
of sectors –centers and state entities that deal with this topic, the victims, 
their communities, the private sector, academia, international organizations 
and civil society organizations- and facilitate collaboration and circulation of 
information between producers and users[;] . . . [and u]ndertake efforts and 
initiatives to get the available information to the general public in a format 
that is responsive to the needs of a variety of audiences and populations of 
differing economic and educational levels, different cultures and different 
languages. The safety and privacy of the victims should be paramount in this 
reporting process.  
Id. at 120−21.  
 469. The United States Citizenship and Immigration Service’s (USCIS) use of technology to 
bolster transparency, and its similarity to the Commission as a quasi-judicial body, makes it an 
appropriate comparative study. The Commission could learn from the 2009 USCIS redesigned 
website and the amount of information available to the public on it. The website 
(https://egov.uscis.gov/cris/Dashboard.do) provides applicants and their attorneys with 
information about case status (e.g. where in the process their case is at). Once a petitioner enters 
in her case number, she will see a dot highlighted over which part of the process her case is at. 
There is also a summary of each stage of the adjudication process, so that the petitioner can know 
what to expect. From here, she can also see how long she might expect before her case is fully 
adjudicated with a decision. The USCIS website gives detailed instructions when downloading an 
application form on how to fill out the form, what type of evidence should be submitted, and what 
kinds of cases “win,” versus what types “lose,” so as to ensure that its public and petitioners are 
fully informed. The website (https://egov.uscis.gov/cris/processTimesDisplayInit.do) also 
provides information on the average time that it takes for a particular case to be adjudicated by 
each individual office.  
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negotiations specified by country, number of cases with Article 50 
reports approved divided by country, number of petitions not 
transmitted by the Secretariat disaggregated by country and reason for 
the decision, or data on petitions and cases disaggregated by sex and 
gender, ethnicity, and age of the victim(s). Furthermore, the 
Commission should publicize its rationale for when it does or does not 
apply time saving rules.470 
C.  Administration and Institutional Culture 
1.  Performance Management 
The Commission has announced plans to create a performance 
management scheme for 2011-2015.471  As part of this plan, the IACHR 
intends to emphasize consistency in drafting reports, and will create 
methods for staff to use their time efficiently and effectively.472 The 
Registry’s performance management scheme can serve as a model for 
performance management throughout the Commission. For example, 
the Commission stated that the average time for review of a new 
petition is twenty-five months.473 The Commission should develop an 
internal consensus on what constitutes a reasonable time for processing 
a petition or case so that standards can be developed for determining 
whether its effort to combat delay is progressing.474 The establishment 
of indicative timeframes must not be construed as a “sunset clause,” 
requiring that a petition or case be dismissed as a consequence of 
missing the target timeframe. Such an approach would not only harm 
the victims who do not control the pace of adjudication, but it would 
mainly benefit the States—which do not provide the Commission with 
the necessary funds to process petitions and cases more expeditiously in 
the first place.475 Also, the Commission needs to attend to the unique 
needs of each case and petition, since the reasonability of one case or 
petition is not automatically reasonable in another. In other words, the 
reasonableness standard should be indicative of the expected timeframe, 
 
 470. See OAS Working Group, supra note 15, at 12; MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 
107.  
 471. STRATEGIC PLAN PART II, supra note 162, at 4−5. 
 472. Id. 
 473. MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 96. 
 474. Id. See also OAS Working Group, supra note 15, at 12 (recommending the Commission 
to adopt at least an indicative timeframe for each of the stages of the procedure). 
 475. Coalition Observations, supra note 338, at 11. 
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but have enough flexibility to accommodate the needs of a particular 
petition or case.  
The Commission should also measure the performance of each of 
the four regional groups and make the results public. The Commission 
can use performance measurement and management to determine where 
it needs to add more resources, help its staff understand their goals, and 
learn more about its own strengths and weaknesses.476 The lawyers of 
the Commission can also understand their own practices better. 
Moreover, the IACHR can examine the practices of particular regional 
units that may be more efficient than other units and try to replicate 
those practices throughout. 
There may be some concern within the Commission that 
implementing performance measurement will affect its culture and 
goals. However, performance measurement and management is not 
always about individual actors or transforming the workplace into a 
mechanical environment.477 The use of flexible targets, rather than hard-
and-fast goals, is an example of the use of performance measurement 
and management within the Commission.478 The Registry has shown 
that such a system can be effectively integrated with the Commission’s 
culture.479 Furthermore, perhaps a change in culture is needed if backlog 
and delays are embedded in that culture. In fact, researchers have shown 
that changes in case-processing speed require changes in the attitudes 
and practices of all members of the community involved in such 
systems.480 Researchers have demonstrated that “both speed and backlog 
are determined in large part by established expectations, practices, and 
informal rules of behavior” of those administering the system and 
litigating.481 Those expectations, practices and behaviors were termed 
“local legal culture.”482  Since both the adjudicatory bodies and the 
litigants have adapted to a given pace of adjudication, these 
expectations and practices must be overcome for there to be any 
successful attempt to increase the pace of litigation.483 
A potential shortcoming to avoid is that the lawyers at the 
Commission may be tempted or even required to sacrifice higher quality 
to improve their numbers. It is important to note that the Commission 
has stated that in order to speed up the process it “will not . . . sacrifice 
 
 476.  MAXIMIZING JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 97. 
 477. Id. 
 478. Id. 
 479. Id. 
 480. Steelman, supra note 162, at 151. 
 481. Id. at 153. 
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the quality of its decisions or deliberation process.”484 The Secretariat 
management team and the Commissioners must not let performance 
measurements based on numbers diminish the quality of reports. The 
Commission’s effectiveness strongly relies on the persuasiveness of its 
decisions.485 At the same time, the Commission and its Executive 
Secretariat should find the proper balance between an intended goal of 
perfection and the need to dispense cases in a timely manner.486 
2.  Integration of the so-called “Registry” approach  
to the Rest of the Commission 
The creation and expansion of the “Registry” has significantly 
contributed to the System’s efficiency.487 Its model of time-
measurement as well as its targeted goals should be more clearly 
incorporated within the Commission. The backlog and the delays do not 
affect only new petitions, but rather, they appear throughout the process 
of the Commission. For that reason, the Commission should redistribute 
the resources allocated to the Registry throughout the Executive 
Secretariat and expand the Registry’s methodological approach to the 
rest of the areas responsible for processing petitions and cases.488 
3.  Technology  
The Commission should take proactive efforts to embrace and 
promote technological changes. The Commission has instituted a 
program called PPP that digitizes communications from individual 
petitioners and States, so that they may check the status of their matters 
via the Internet.489 However, the Commission does not have a program 
that digitizes petitions and cases older than 2007.490 Therefore, the 
Commission needs to digitally process all petitions and cases still 
pending in its docket.  
The databases of the IACHR should be made publicly available. 
The parties to the petition and cases should be able to track the status of 
their petition or case. Parties should also be able to submit additional 
information and documents online. In fact, the States had asked the 
 
 484. Position Document, supra note 59, at 13. 
 485. See Slaughter & Helfer, supra note 322, at 318. 
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Commission to improve mechanisms to enable states, petitioners, and 
concerned victims to access records of petitions and cases in electronic 
format in order to encourage the prompt solution of said cases.491  
Other telecommunication measures should be implemented to 
speed up the analysis and discussion of cases and petitions. Meetings of 
pre-session or inter-session working groups or the plenary of the 
Commission could take place by telephone or videoconference. The 
IACHR should also convene hearings via videoconference with the 
parties in order to advance friendly settlement negotiations and, when 
appropriate, to receive information or testimonies.  
IX. CONCLUSION 
There are three overarching obstacles that the Commission faces in 
its case system: a large backlog of petitions waiting to be dealt with, a 
long time period before petitions and cases can be fully resolved, and an 
insufficient number of petitions and cases fully resolved with a merits 
decision. The Commission’s changes in the 2000 Rules of Procedure 
have exacerbated these problems. In splitting the Commission’s 
decision into Admissibility and Merits, the rule change added another 
step that further delayed the processing of petitions and shifted the 
emphasis to the preliminary phases of the procedure.  
There are several lessons from the study of the process of the 
Commission, its delays, and backlog. The case of the Commission 
supports the proposition that a goals-based analysis is necessary in order 
to assert the effectiveness of an adjudicatory body. It also demonstrates 
that the context in which it operates offers possibilities and constraints 
in achieving those goals. The goal-based approach provides tools to 
understand how the Commission operates and, in particular, to assess 
how its structure, process and outcomes contribute to or undermine its 
effectiveness.492 Particularly, the multiplicity of goals that the 
Commission pursues challenges the idea that compliance with its 
recommendations is the only, or even the main, measure of its 
effectiveness.493  
Every international human rights system confronts the same 
paradox—the States that created the system are at the same time the 
subject of control. Although the States may confer a number of powers 
on the supervisory organs of the system, States will generally retain 
control over its functions among them by selecting the members and 
 
 491. See OAS Working Group, supra note 15, at 12; OAS Results, supra note 303. 
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controlling the funding of the supervisory bodies. States also play the 
central role in enforcing their decisions. This paradox creates 
institutional and political tensions, which interfere with the work and 
effectiveness of these organs.494 The current backlog of the Commission 
provides a clear example of this paradox. States do not fund the IACHR 
adequately. States do not submit information or evidence in time, do not 
participate or agree on enough friendly settlements, and do not comply 
with the Commission’s recommendations.  
Although human rights are given great importance in the public 
resolutions of the OAS, and the strengthening the IACHR is designated 
as a priority, the Commission is viewed as a thorn in the side of those 
member states that have continuing human rights problems.495 Many 
States within the OAS continue to fear the work of the Commission.496 
Interestingly, many OAS members see the IACHR as far too effective 
and thus try to limit its impact. Many proposals coming from States do 
not seem to be constructive but rather attempts to undermine the System 
in general and the Commission in particular.497 In this article, I made 
several references to recommendations issued by the OAS Working 
Group, which was created with the idea of strengthening the 
Commission. In fact, that Working Group clearly had, in the view of 
many, the intention of diminishing the effectiveness and efficiency of 
the Commission.498 Thus, I included only those recommendations that 
coincide with those formulated by other actors or that help us 
understand the constraints that the Commission faces in dealing with 
these issues.  
Any attempt to comprehend the functioning of the Commission’s 
procedure must therefore take into account the hostile environment in 
which it operates. As such, the context in which the Commission 
operates supports a goal-based approach to measure its effectiveness as 
it demonstrates the constraints that hinder international adjudicatory 
bodies in their particular political and institutional environment.499  
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However, not all of the Commission’s problems are attributable to 
lack of funding or State support. Not all of the solutions depend upon 
finding additional money. An efficient organization is one that uses 
what it has to maximize its output. In this sense, the Commission’s 
chronic lack of financial and human resources does not justify its 
inefficiency. The OAS should of course adequately fund the 
Commission and it is the principal party responsible for the current 
backlog and delays. Nevertheless, this does not excuse the Commission 
from attempting to be as efficient as possible with the limited resources 
that it has.  
The Commission’s situation also demonstrates how a human rights 
body must find a proper balance between efficiency and effectiveness. 
This is not an easy task as efficiency and effectiveness are hard to 
measure, and adjudicatory bodies tend to have multiple goals that can 
and do contradict each other. With respect to the Commission, its 
resource constraints and multiplicity of goals mean that the Commission 
must make difficult decisions about which tasks to emphasize and how 
to balance competing demands. The resource constraints also mean that 
efficiency within the Commission is vital to its success. In balancing its 
efficiency and effectiveness, the Commission must consider its broader 
goals, while also realizing that the growing delays may thwart its ability 
to actually address the problems of petitioners.  
The pace of adjudication is closely tied to the goals of the 
adjudicatory body and expediency does not always contribute to 
effectiveness. Time may be required to accommodate the needs of the 
victims as they prepare evidence, secure State engagement, and provide 
a space for cooperation and fruitful dialogue. At the same time, 
excessive delays could hamper the overall effectiveness of the System. 
The lack of response to the vast number of petitions by the Commission, 
and the delays and inconsistencies in their resolution frustrates the 
victims, petitioners and States, and creates distrust in the System.  This 
often subjects the victims to a process of re-victimization.   
Finally, the case of the Commission demonstrates that in 
articulating recommendations for an international adjudicatory body, the 
international community should have realistic expectations and 
understand the value of certain delays and of a flexible process.500  At 
the end of the day, the study of the Commission indicates that the 
overriding interest of the process and the outcome of such a process is 
the fulfillment of its overall goals, not expedience.  
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